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#### Obama’s strong -- leverage makes GOP obstructionism on immigration unsustainable

Jeff Mason, Reuters, 10/19/13, Analysis: Despite budget win, Obama has weak hand with Congress , health.yahoo.net/news/s/nm/analysis-despite-budget-win-obama-has-weak-hand-with-congress

Democrats believe, however, that Obama's bargaining hand may be strengthened by the thrashing Republicans took in opinion polls over their handling of the shutdown.

"This shutdown re-emphasized the overwhelming public demand for compromise and negotiation. And that may open up a window," said Ben LaBolt, Obama's 2012 campaign spokesman and a former White House aide.

"There's no doubt that some Republican members (of Congress) are going to oppose policies just because the president's for it. But the hand of those members was significantly weakened."

If he does have an upper hand, Obama is likely to apply it to immigration reform. The White House had hoped to have a bill concluded by the end of the summer. A Senate version passed with bipartisan support earlier this year but has languished in the Republican-controlled House.

"It will be hard to move anything forward, unless the Republicans find the political pain of obstructionism too much to bear," said Doug Hattaway, a Democratic strategist and an adviser to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign.

"That may be the case with immigration - they'll face pressure from business and Latinos to advance immigration reform," he said.

#### Plan drains capital—anti-Cuba lobby means a sudden reconciliation with Havana sparks fights

Birns and Mills 13 (Larry, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Frederick B., COHA Senior Research Fellow, 01/30, “Best Time for U.S.–Cuba Rapprochement Is Now,” http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/)

Despite the basic intransigence of US policy towards Cuba, in recent years, important changes have been introduced by Havana: state control over the economy has been diminished; most travel restrictions affecting both Americans and Cubans on the island have been lifted; and the “group of 75” Cuban dissidents detained in 2003 have been freed. Washington has all but ignored these positive changes by Havana, but when it comes to interacting with old foes such as those of Myanmar, North Korea, and Somalia, somehow constructive dialogue is the order of the day. One reason for this inconsistency is the continued opposition by the anti-Castro lobby to a change of course by Washington. The anti-Castro lobby and their allies in the US Congress argue that the reforms coming out of Havana are too little too late and that political repression continues unabated. They continue to see the embargo as a tool for coercing either more dramatic reforms or regime change. It is true that the reformist tendency in Cuba does not include a qualitative move from a one party system to political pluralism. Lamentably, Cuba reportedly continues to use temporary detentions and the occasional jailing of non-violent dissidents to limit the parameters of political debate and total freedom of association. The authors agree that no non-violent Cuban dissident should be intimidated, detained or jailed. But continuing to maliciously turn the screws on Havana has never provided an incentive for more democracy in any sense of the word nor has it created a political opening into which Cuba, with confidence, could enter. The easing of tensions between Washington and Havana is more likely to contribute to the evolution of a more democratic form of socialism on the island, the early stages of which we may presently be witnessing. In any case the precise form of such change inevitably should and will be decided in Cuba, not in Washington or Miami. To further moves towards rapprochement with Cuba, the U.S. State Department should remove the country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It is an invention to depict Havana as a state sponsor of terrorism, a charge only levied by the State Department under pressure from Hill hardliners. As researcher Kevin Edmunds, quite properly points out: “This position is highly problematic, as the United States has actively engaged in over 50 years of economic and covert destabilization in Cuba, going so far as blindly protecting wanted terrorists such as Luis Posada Carilles and Orlando Bosch, both former CIA agents accused of dozens of terrorist attacks in Cuba and the United States ” (Nov. 15, 2012, Kevin Edmonds blog). It was precisely the propensity of some anti-Castro extremists to plan terrorist attacks against Cuba that urgently motivated the infiltration of such groups by the Cuban five as well as the close monitoring of these organizations by the FBI. Another gesture of good will would be for the White House to grant clemency to the Cuban five: Gerardo Hernandez, Ramón Labañino, Fernando Gonzalez, Antonio Guerrero and René Gonzalez. They are Cuban nationals who were convicted in a Miami court in 2001 and subsequently sentenced to terms ranging from 15 years to double life, mostly on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. Despite requests for a change of venue out of Miami, which at first was granted and later denied, the trial took place in a politically charged Miami atmosphere that arguably tainted the proceedings and compromised justice. Supporters maintain that the Cuban five had infiltrated extremist anti-Castro organizations in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Cuba and did not pose any security threat to the United States. It would be an important humanitarian gesture to let them go home. Perhaps such a gesture might facilitate reciprocity on the part of Cuban authorities when it comes to American engineer Alan Gross who is presently being detained in a Cuban jail. There would probably be a political price to pay by the Obama administration for taking steps towards reconciliation with Havana, but if Obama’s election to a second term means that there is to be a progressive dividend, surely such a dividend ought to include a change in US policy towards the island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washington has lifted some of the restrictions on travel between the US and Cuba and now allows Cuban Americans to send remittances to relatives on the island. The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) on January 4, 2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harsh terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which toughened the embargo during the special period in Cuba. The Cuba Reconciliation Act, however, is unlikely to get much traction, especially with ultra-hardliner Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign Relations Committee, and her counterpart, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who is about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the anti-Castro Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures advocated here as a capitulation to the Castro brothers. But as we have argued, a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way undermined, but might in fact be advanced by détente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of history may very well be that it ought never to have been started.

#### Obama’s capital key – Boehner

Bill Scher, The Week, 10/18/13, How to make John Boehner cave on immigration , theweek.com/article/index/251361/how-to-make-john-boehner-cave-on-immigration

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) generally adheres to the unwritten Republican rule that bars him from allowing votes on bills opposed by a majority of Republicans, even if they would win a majority of the full House.

But he's caved four times this year, allowing big bills to pass with mainly Democratic support. They include repealing the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans; providing Hurricane Sandy relief; expanding the Violence Against Women act to better cover immigrants, Native Americans, and LGBT survivors of abuse; and this week's bill raising the debt limit and reopening the federal government.

Many presume the Republican House is a black hole sucking President Obama's second-term agenda into oblivion. But the list of Boehner's past retreats offers a glimmer of hope, especially to advocates of immigration reform. Though it has languished in the House, an immigration overhaul passed with bipartisan support in the Senate, and was given a fresh push by Obama in the aftermath of the debt limit deal.

The big mystery that immigration advocates need to figure out: What makes Boehner cave? Is there a common thread? Is there a sequence of buttons you can push that forces Boehner to relent?

Two of this year's caves happened when Boehner was backed up against hard deadlines: The Jan. 1 fiscal cliff and the Oct. 17 debt limit. Failure to concede meant immediate disaster. Reject the bipartisan compromise on rolling back the Bush tax cuts, get blamed for jacking up taxes on every taxpayer. Reject the Senate's three-month suspension of the debt limit, get blamed for sparking a global depression. Boehner held out until the absolute last minute both times, but he was not willing to risk blowing the deadline.

A third involved the response to an emergency: Hurricane Sandy. Conservative groups were determined to block disaster relief because — as with other federal disaster responses — the $51 billion legislative aid package did not include offsetting spending cuts. Lacking Republican votes, Boehner briefly withdrew the bill from consideration, unleashing fury from New York and New Jersey Republicans, including Gov. Chris Christie. While there wasn't a hard deadline to meet, disaster relief was a time-sensitive matter, and the pressure from Christie and his allies was unrelenting. Two weeks after pulling the bill, Boehner put it on the floor, allowing it to pass over the objections of 179 Republicans.

The fourth cave occurred in order to further reform and expand a government program: The Violence Against Women Act. The prior version of the law had been expired for over a year, as conservatives in the House resisted the Senate bill in the run-up to the 2012 election. But after Mitt Romney suffered an 18-point gender gap in his loss to Obama, and after the new Senate passed its version again with a strong bipartisan vote, Boehner was unwilling to resist any longer. Two weeks later, the House passed the Senate bill with 138 Republicans opposed.

Unfortunately for immigration advocates, there is no prospect of widespread pain if reform isn't passed. There is no immediate emergency, nor threat of economic collapse.

But there is a deadline of sorts: The 2014 midterm elections.

If we've learned anything about Boehner this month, it's that he's a party man to the bone. He dragged out the shutdown and debt limit drama for weeks, without gaining a single concession, simply so his most unruly and revolutionary-minded members would believe he fought the good fight and stay in the Republican family. What he won is party unity, at least for the time being.

What Boehner lost for his Republicans is national respectability. Republican Party approval hit a record low in both the most recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll and Gallup poll.

Here's where immigration advocates have a window of opportunity to appeal to Boehner's party pragmatism. Their pitch: The best way to put this disaster behind them is for Republicans to score a big political victory. You need this.

A year after the Republican brand was so bloodied that the Republican National Committee had to commission a formal "autopsy," party approval is the worst it has ever been. You've wasted a year. Now is the time to do something that some voters will actually like.

There's reason to hope he could be swayed. In each of the four cases in which he allowed Democrats to carry the day, he put the short-term political needs of the Republican Party over the ideological demands of right-wing activists.

Boehner will have to do another round of kabuki. He can't simply swallow the Senate bill in a day. There will have to be a House version that falls short of activists' expectations, followed by tense House-Senate negotiations. Probably like in the most formulaic of movies, and like the fiscal cliff and debt limit deals, there will have to be an "all-is-lost moment" right before we get to the glorious ending. Boehner will need to given the room to do all this again.

But he won't do it without a push. A real good push.

#### Critical to US economic recovery

Aaron Terrazas, Migration Policy Institute, July 2011, The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EconomicIntegration.pdf

The fate of immigrants in the United States and their integration into the labor market are impossible to separate from the state of the overall US economy and the fate of all US workers. During periods of economic expansion and relative prosperity, upward economic mobility among the native born generates opportunities for immigrants to gain a foothold in the US labor market and to gradually improve their status over time. In many respects, a growing economy during the 1990s and early 2000s provided ample opportunity for immigrants — and especially their children — to gradually improve their status over time. However, the story of immigrants’ integration into the US labor force during the years leading to the recession was also mixed: In general, the foreign born had high labor force participation, but they were also more likely to occupy low-paying jobs. The most notable advances toward economic integration occur over generations, due in large part to the openness of US educational institutions to the children of immigrants and the historic lack of employment discrimination against workers with an immigrant background. In the wake of the global economic crisis, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of the US economy and labor market. Most forecasts suggest that the next decade will be substantially different from the past26 and it is not clear if previous trends in immigrants’ economic integration will continue. The recession, weak recovery, and prospect of prolonged stagnation as a result of continuing high public debt, could realign the economic and social forces that have historically propelled the the less-educated labor force have been dismal for decades. In some respects, the recession accelerated these trends. While the prospect of greater demand for US manufactured goods from emerging markets might slow gradual decay of the US manufacturing industry, the outlook for the industry remains weak. Steady educational gains throughout the developing world have simultaneously increased downward wage pressure on highly skilled workers who, in the past, generated substantial secondary demand for services that immigrants often provide.

#### **Nuclear war**

Harris and Burrows ‘9

(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating** **crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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#### Hardline against Cuba now – terror list

Kasperowicz ’13 – Pete, Staff Writer for the Hill, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list”, 5/30, http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements

As expected, the State Department on Thursday released a report that keeps Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, even as it acknowledged that some conditions on the island were improving.

State's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012 was widely expected to keep Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, despite some reports that incorrectly suggested that it might be used by Secretary of State John Kerry to shift policy on Cuba.

In the case of Cuba, State listed three primary reasons for keeping the island nation on the list. First, it noted that Cuba continued to provide a safe haven for about two dozens members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a group charged with terrorism in Spain.

State's report, though, seemed to give Cuba some credit for hosting peace talks between the government of Colombia and members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The report notes that Cuba offered aid to FARC members "in past years," and indicates that Havana is no longer supporting the rebel group.

A second major reason for listing Cuba was that the government "continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United States." That language is unchanged from last year's report.

And thirdly, State said Cuba has deficiencies in the area of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, just as it did in last year’s report. This year, however, State also noted that Cuba has become a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America, which requires Havana to adopt anti-money laundering recommendations.

But still, this improvement and the hosting of peace talks between FARC and Colombia were not enough to remove Cuba from the list.

#### Lifting the embargo is appeasement – emboldens adversaries and turns case

Brookes ‘9 – Peter, Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, “KEEP THE EMBARGO, O”, April 15, <http://nypost.com/2009/04/15/keep-the-embargo-o/>

IN another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba.

Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance.

Sure, it’s fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years — even though Cubanos aren’t allowed to visit America.

And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty — even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there.

In the end, though, it’s still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who’ll decide whether there’ll be a thaw in ties with the United States — or not.

And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.

Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) — without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime’s hard-line policies.

So much for the theory that if we’re nice to them, they’ll be nice to us.

Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.

Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with — without any concessions on Cuba’s part, of course.

Lifting the embargo won’t normalize relations, but instead legitimize — and wave the white flag to — Fidel’s 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.

Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers — allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.

The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that’ll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.

The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties — no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.

Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won’t live in.

We also don’t need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean — or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)

With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.

The embargo has stifled Havana’s ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.

Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn’t free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.

The US embargo remains a matter of principle — and an appropriate response to Cuba’s brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven’t we learned that yet?

Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Turns the Multilateralism advantage

Weissberg ’10 – Robert, Professor of Political Science-Emeritus, University of Illinois-Urbana, “President Obama's Compulsive Appeasement Disorder”, 9/27, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/president\_obamas\_compulsive\_ap.html

There's a simple explanation: we are no longer feared. Superpowers of yesteryear, going back to the Greeks and Romans, were feared for a reason -- they leveled a city to make an example. Today, by contrast, Uncle Sam relies on cajoling, bribery (think North Korea), entreating puny leaders of inchoate states (special envoys to the PLO's Mahmoud Abbas) and otherwise playing weak hands. We have gone from resolve to U.N. resolution. We've forgotten Machiavelli's sage advice: since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.

Being feared does not require bombing Iran into the Stone Age, though that would certainly terrify North Korea and even slow down the Somali pirates. Being feared is when your enemy believes that you are willing to use overwhelming, deadly force, and this need not require nuking anybody. The trick is creating a credible, threatening persona -- convincing your enemy that while you may speak softly, you also carry a big stick and are willing to use it. Israel long ago learned this lesson, regardless of world outrage.

#### US appeasement causes North Korean nuclear weapons use

Grey ‘10 – CFO and co-founder of [CapLinked](http://www.caplinked.com/), founder of Crestridge Investments and Third Wave Partners, and managing director of Emigrant Bank Christopher, “BLAME APPEASEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S ANTICS”, WND Commentary, 11/29, http://www.wnd.com/2010/11/234213/

The appeasement policy of the Obama administration, including his endless apologies for America and his coddling of dictators such as Hugo Chavez and Ahmedinejad are the diplomatic equivalent of throwing red meat in front of North Korea’s wild, carnivorous beast of a regime and daring them to eat it. They have not disappointed. Conventional wisdom is that this attack was caused by the inevitable turmoil resulting from the ongoing transfer of power from longstanding dictator Kim Jong-il to his young son, Kim Jong-un. Some have suggested the attack was intended to give the appearance inside heavily controlled North Korea that Kim Jong-un was responsible for a great military victory against the South. This may be true, but why do something so extreme and risk creating a real war, as well as angering their benefactors in China, just for internal public relations reasons? People say the North Koreans are crazy and their behavior can’t be explained with reason, but I think their behavior shows a rational mind at work. They have calculated that the current American administration is so weak, so willing to surrender and appease an aggressor, that they really don’t have any significant risk of paying the price for this attack. The North Koreans may have miscalculated though. South Korea was shaken to its core by what happened. Up until this attack, the South Koreans have been moving away from a close alliance with America’s military. They have been pushing for U.S. troops to leave. They have been objecting to the economic and political costs of a perceived military and diplomatic dependency on America. They generally have been conciliatory with North Korea and have bent over backwards to avoid confrontation and hostility. They have supported the Chinese approach to engaging North Korea, which basically involves treating them as equals. Even after the incident earlier this year in which North Korea sank a South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors, the South exercised restraint.

This time is different. South Korea’s people and government are enraged by this attack. The rhetoric coming from South Korea towards the North is now the most hostile that it has been since the two countries were at war nearly 60 years ago. For South Korea, this attack seems to feel[s] like Pearl Harbor. Their national identity has been violated. Any kinship they have felt with the North seems to be gone. High level government officials in the South are calling for military retaliation and not ruling out the possibility of war with the North. Suddenly, South Korea is begging to get closer to America’s military. They requested one of our carrier groups be sent immediately to conduct war games with them. Of course, we have accommodated them. We have no choice but to help them not only by treaty but also because we cannot afford to turn our back on an ally. If we don’t support our allies, especially those allies of over 60 years, we won’t have any allies in the world. China is in a similar mess. They cannot back down from their support of North Korea even as this situation is exactly what they don’t want for both diplomatic and economic reasons. There is no upside for the Chinese to get dragged into a war on the Korean Peninsula. They want to keep North Korea, which is basically their violent stepchild, in a controlled box. Unfortunately, North Korea is making it clear that they want more. They want to flex their muscles. That’s what this attack was really trying to demonstrate. North Korea wanted to show that they could blatantly attack the South at will, kill civilians, and get away with it because both the South Koreans and the Americans don’t have the guts to do anything about it. North Korea further has threatened to use nuclear weapons both on South Korea and even on the United States, Japan or any country supporting South Korea if war does occur. They have moved surface to surface missiles into position. This provocation cannot be taken lightly. We know that North Korea has nuclear warheads as well as the necessary long range surface to surface missiles on which to send them**.** They probably don’t have the technology to reach the mainland of the United States, but they could possibly reach Hawaii. Defense analysts have feared something like this for years. Of course, any such attack logically would be suicide. The United States easily could annihilate the entire country of North Korea. In all likelihood, these are empty threats. However, the risk of a severe and disastrous miscalculation by the North Koreans grows with every sign of weakness by the United States.

During the Cuban missile crisis decades ago, the only way we prevailed was by convincing the Soviets that we would annihilate them if they attacked us. We and our allies need similar resolve, rather than half measures and conciliation, right now. North Korea is a bully. They view any attempts to help them as weak. They view negotiation and diplomacy as weak. They view civilized behavior as weak. The only thing they understand is strength. They need to believe that we will destroy them if they do not stop their aggression. The Chinese can help deliver this message to the North Koreans, but first the Chinese have to believe it themselves. The Chinese have been pushing us around economically for years. They violate trade and currency agreements at will. Every time we raise an objection to their human rights abuses or aggressive behavior towards Taiwan, Tibet, or Japan, they tell us shut up and stay out of their affairs. We have a credibility problem with them as well. To be fair to the Obama administration, this appeasement of North Korea has been going on for decades. No administration has been willing to step up and get rid of this rogue state that is a danger to the entire world. The difference now is that we have circumstances inside North Korea that are more volatile than they have been in decades combined and an American administration that is perceived as the weakest on national security since Jimmy Carter. This is an extremely dangerous mixture. Hopefully Obama and his team can, like John Kennedy and his team did during the Cuban crisis, rise to the occasion and get the North Koreans to back down. War can be prevented, but the possibility of war is real. This situation could spin out of control and lead to a catastrophe if it is not handled properly. Let’s hope that this administration is up to daunting job at hand. Potentially millions of lives depend on it.

#### Extinction

Chol ‘2 – Kim Myong, Director Center for Korean American Peace, 10-24, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A\_Chol.html

Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." U.S. Perception Counts Most What counts most is not so much North nuclear and missile capability as the American perception that North Korea may have such capability. No matter how true North Korean nuclear capability may, such capability does not serve the political purposes of Kim Jong Il and his policy planners in dealing with the U.S., unless Washington policy planners perceive North Korean nuclear threat as real. Their view is of the Americans being hoaxed into suspecting that the North Koreans have already nuclear capability. The Americans are the most skeptical people in the world. Due to the historic al background of their nation building, they are least ready to trust what others say. What they trust most is guns and money. This is the reason why the Americans show a strong preference for lie detectors, which are ubiquitous in the U.S. If the North Koreans say that they have nuclear capability, the immediate American response is to doubt the statement. If the North Koreans deny, the Americans have a typical propensity to suspect that they have. Most interestingly, Americans readily accept as true acknowledgement after repeated denial. It is easy to imagine how stunned James Kelly and American officials were at the reported post-denial acknowledgement by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju that the North Koreans have a uranium enrichment centrifuge. As expected, American officials have been ordered into globe-hopping tours, rallying international support for their campaign to apply pressure to bear upon the North Koreans to dissuade them from their alleged nuclear weapons program. Bush, Rice, Rumsfeld and other tough guys took special care to paint North Korea as different from Iraq, offering the North Koreans the striped-pants treatment. It is too obvious that indirect diplomacy is not effective now matter how hard the Americans may consult their allies and the allies of North Korea. The past consultation with Russia and China failed to produce any positive results, because they have little leverage with North Korea. The four-way talks are a case in point, where the Americans ended up talking with the North Koreans. Three Options Available Then the question arises of how to interpret the reported North Korean admission of the possession of a uranium enrichment device. One most likely explanation is that it is more of an invitation to diplomatic negotiations than refusal to talk. There are a few months to go before the target year of 2003 strikes. In other words, the Kang Sok Ju statement means that the North Koreans still keep the nuclear trump card, namely, that the Bush Administration has no choice but to pick up where the Clinton Administration left off. The Bush Administration is left with three choices: The first is just to ignore North Korea and let the regime of Kim Jong Il emerge a nuclear power with atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their arsenal with a fleet of ICBMs locked on to American targets. This option is most likely to set into motion the domino phenomenon, inducing Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms, making unnecessary the American military presence on their soil with anti-Americanism rising to new heights. The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of [hu]mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.

## 1nc

#### Text: The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether **The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with Cuba** with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

#### Prior binding consultation key to U.S.-Brazil relations

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A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved work¬ing with Washington than against it.¶ The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping in-terests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Rus-sia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particu¬larly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically nec¬essary to highlight differences even when interests are simi-lar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ.¶ A first operational step, therefore, is for both coun-tries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of internation¬al law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This orga¬nization hampers the exchange of information and con¬sultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bi¬laterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

#### Relations solve global prolif

Trinkunas & Bruneau 12 (Harold & Thomas, Ph.D. at Naval Post Graduate School, Center on Contemporary conflict, “US Brazil Workshop on Global and Regional Security,” December 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA574567&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Brazilian participants also noted the particular alignment of domestic constituencies regarding issues such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which they saw as demonstrating that Brazil was a consolidated democracy that had to respond to domestic political and economic interests in much the same way that the United States government did. The United States and Brazil also look very similar in their relationship with the region, one participant said. If we actually look at the interests of United States and Brazil, they are very convergent. One Brazilian participant also added that, like the United States, Brazil is happy to retreat back to unilateralism. Brazilian participants repeatedly emphasized that Brazil is uniquely qualified to play the role of international peacemaker due to their peaceful traditions, the strength of their diplomacy, and their experience in reducing tensions during international crises. Brazilians also stressed that as a consolidated free market democracy, Brazil is inherently a responsible power in the international arena. They disagreed with the characterization of Brazil as a ‘spoiler’, a position held by some U.S. observers of global nonproliferation efforts (albeit not by the U.S. participants in this dialogue). Again and again Brazilian participants emphasized their responsible and mature behavior in important international issues, including nuclear ones. The dialogue participants from outside of the region agreed that Brazil has acquired a good reputation for its skilled diplomacy. One U.S. participant predicted that Brazil would eventually join the expanded UN Security Council as a permanent member. The Brazilians considered the U.S. and Brazil to be natural partners in international nonproliferation efforts, and both sides agreed that the international nonproliferation regime was in crisis. They offered different explanations, however, for the roots of the regime crisis. A participant from within the region added that it is difficult for Brazil and the U.S. to be on the same page or even debate nuclear issues because the two countries comes from very different ends of the nuclear spectrum. Participants observed that the NPT regime is in the midst of a legitimacy crisis. One participant said that from an institutional point of view, the original design of the regime left it unable to adapt to changes that have taken place in the international system since the Cold War. Some U.S. participants expressed optimism that the NPT has been bolstered by the Obama administration’s support for the NPT. A change in both attitude and policy from the administration has fostered a new sense of hope in the NPT’s utility. This participant added that only by fully engaging other members of the NPT can the U.S. and Brazil hope to make the non-proliferation regime stronger.

#### Extinction

Victor AUtgoff**,** Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival,p.87.90

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

The status quo is always an option – proving the CP worse does not justify the plan. Logical decision-making is the most portable skill.

And, presumption remains negative—the counterplan is less change and a tie goes to the runner.

## 1nc

#### Simulating conflict scenarios ignores the complexity which taints predictions—the aff’s linear war-planning fails and causes escalating conflict

Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ‘97

(Robert, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

Because actions change the environment in which they operate, identical but later behavior does not produce identical results: history is about the changes produced by previous thought and action as people and organizations confront each other through time. The final crisis leading to World War II provides an illustration of some of these processes. Hitler had witnessed his adversaries give in to pressure; as he explained, "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich."21 But the allies had changed because of Hitler’s behavior. So had Poland. As A.J.P. Taylor puts it, "Munich cast a long shadow. Hitler waited for it to happen again; Beck took warning from the fate of Benes."22 Hitler was not the only leader to fail to understand that his behavior would change his environment. Like good linear social scientists, many statesmen see that their actions can produce a desired outcome, all other things being equal, and project into the future the maintenance of the conditions that their behavior will in fact undermine. This in part explains the Argentine calculations preceding the seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas. Their leaders could see that Britain’s ability to protect its position was waning, as evinced by the declining naval presence, and that Argentina’s claim to the islands had received widespread international support. But what they neglected was the likelihood that the invasion would alter these facts, unifying British opinion against accepting humiliation and changing the issue for international audiences from the illegitimacy of colonialism to the illegitimacy of the use of force. A similar neglect of the transformative power of action may explain why Saddam Hussein thought he could conquer Kuwait. Even if America wanted to intervene, it could do so only with the support and cooperation of other Arab countries, which had sympathized with Iraq’s claims and urged American restraint. But the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased the Arabs’ perception of threat and so altered their stance. Furthermore, their willingness to give credence to Iraqi promises was destroyed by the deception that had enabled the invasion to take everyone by surprise. Germany’s miscalculation in 1917 was based on a related error: although unrestricted submarine warfare succeeded in sinking more British shipping than the Germans had estimated would be required to drive Britain from the war, the American entry (which Germany expected) led the British to tolerate shortages that otherwise would have broken their will because they knew that if they held out, the U.S. would rescue them.23

The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which then impinges on them can lead observers—and actors as well— to underestimate actors’ influence. Thus states caught in a conflict spiral believe that they have little choice but to respond in kind to the adversary’s hostility. This may be true, but it may have been the states’ earlier behavior that generated the situation that now is compelling. Robert McNamara complains about how he was mislead by faulty military reporting but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told.24

Products of Interaction as the Unit of Analysis

Interaction can be so intense and transformative that we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation. We are accustomed to referring to roads as safe or dangerous, but if the drivers understand the road conditions this formulation may be misleading: the knowledge that, driving habits held constant, one stretch is safe or dangerous will affect how people drive—they are likely to slow down and be more careful when they think the road is dangerous and speed up and let their attention wander when it is "safe." It is then the road-driver system that is the most meaningful unit of analysis. In the wake of the sinking of a roll-on roll-off ferry, an industry representative said: With roro’s, the basic problem is that you have a huge open car deck with doors at each end. But people are well aware of this, and it is taken into account in design and operation. You don’t mess around with them. There have not been too many accidents because they are operated with such care.25

#### Warfighting based on linearity causes extinction—rethinking the terms of the simulation itself is key to grappling with every threat environment

Skyttner, professor of natural science – University of Gâvle, professor – Royal Swedish Military Academy, ‘5

(Lars, “Systems theory and the science of military command and control,” Kybernetes Vol. 34, Issue 7/8, p. 1240-1260)

Military activity has constantly been characterised by the need to design, realize, train and thereafter maintain an organization capable to fight against various kinds of external threats. Such a force has always been used in offensive as well as defensive tasks, e.g. from attacking neighbouring enemies to going together in order to defend oneself from invading forces. To succeed with this, strategical, operational and tactical skill is necessary for the joint effort. Further, a flexible tactical adaptation is necessary when the enemy changes his behaviour or take countermeasure.

The military manoeuvring has always felt the need for some kind of decision support and a management system. The decision support has sometimes manifested itself as good advisors or as today in the shape of advanced high-technological computer-aided expert systems. The management system has always consisted of various communication and control devices. How these systems should be constructed, adapted and developed to challenge new threatening pictures in the constantly changing surrounding world is no simple task.

Today the socio-technical systems of the modern society are increasingly all embracing and tighter integrated. System-relations more and more stand out as untransparent, incomprehensible and unmanageable. Furthermore, the world around is so rapidly changed that circumstantial planning often is a thing of the past.

The uncertainties regarding the nature of future combat therefore bring about great demands of flexibility and adaptability of our command and control systems. That qualities like information-advantage and a realistic surrounding-world apprehension call for increased integration of different sensors, arms and communication systems are nevertheless given. As given is that success in combat always is a function of how command is executed and how danger, stress, obscurity and general confusion which constantly exist will be handled. When the enemy no longer is seen in our binoculars and when we not even know who has released an attack against us, the need for creative thinking is of highest priority. Today an event of war even can lack the attacking component and imply hitherto unknown social phenomena.

As compared with such circumstances, traditional military thinking could not be considered particularly successful. There tactical problems always have been reduced to easily recognizable situations with a well-learned standard response. Quite natural, critical thinking, questioning and creativity have not got a prominent role in this kind of education.

Today the security policy situation of Sweden is radically different from the situation only ten years ago. New, extremely fragmented scenarios of a threat exist. A military threatening picture still exists even if it has deteriorated substantially after the end of the cold war. Russia still has attacking capability via distant and NBC-weapons. A military recovery in this country can result in nonmilitary information operations within a ten-year period. The development is difficult to judge but is coherent with the democratic development and the relations to the West.

Just now the most probable threat comes from terrorism. The last years have signified a development towards an ever increasing extent of terrorist groups with better and better armaments. No doubt, some of these groups have NBC-weapons. Those who not have access to such weapons strive for them. Attacks resulting in thousands of victims among innocent people, today is a reality which has been demonstrated by the assault upon World Trade Centre. It is quite possible that such groups will choose to locate internal controversies to neutral ground like Stockholm with pertinent consequence like taking hostages, etc. When such things happen, the odds are against the anti terrorist forces. The terrorists only need to have success once while the combatting forces must be successful every time.

A third kind of security policy threat are those which are information technology related. States as well as criminal gangs and terrorist organisations already today use IT-related systems as weapons apart from their ordinary use. Attacks can be targeted toward our own IT systems, electricity supply systems, telecommunications and economical systems. In our highly computerized society, a small group can cause damages which early required an army. That the danger of IT-attacks has increased can be related to the simple fact that the more something is exposed, the more the threatening picture is reinforced. A special problem in this context is the difficulty to discover if an attack exists at all. The defence against such information warfare will be a big problem in the foreseeable future for our vulnerable society.

It is also not possible to leave out of account the threats coming from economical warfare. Even if the country today has a reasonably stable economy and is supported by the membership of EU, strongly increased fuel price during a period will destabilize society. Large-scale economical crimes pursued for example by the powerful drug mafia in Colombia can also be a real threat. This organisation has scarcely an interest to capture a geographical area. However, they want to consolidate and expand their economical flows. It is necessary to bear in mind that their financial annual turnover is bigger than most European countries.

Consequently, it is necessary to realise that the old and exact security-policy classification into “war” and “peace” hardly is relevant today. A war-like terror action with disastrous consequence can happen without early warning in a situation which we apprehend to be in deepest peace. The goal can be to crush our basic values – not our geographical area. An enumeration of what the modern societies consider these values to be, can be the following:

territorial integrity in the livingspace;

political sovereignty and democracy;

freedom of thought, religion and speech;

a state governed by law with human rights and minority rights;

free market economy; and

the free university.

In the protection of these values, the extensive invasion and mobilization defence with its mass army no longer has a justification. Not including the frontiers of land, sea and air combat, a new frontier has emerged where the battle is fought with global information systems. There the strategic goals have changed so that destruction has been replaced by manipulation, infiltration and assimilation.

All this taken together is the reason why big-scale problem solving seldom work as before. The traditional way of managing war with a large quantity of troops fighting a well defined and localized enemy is barely no longer possible. The lack of success for traditional methods is visible also on civil frontiers like the war against poverty, the war against drugs, and the attempts to extinct AIDS.

The new, multinational and complex threatening pictures which have replaced the old ones, can only be met with a smaller, more modern and flexible elite-force. The heavy striking-force with small command and intelligence resources will be reduced in favour of a network-defence based on the development within information and communication technology. The designation network will, however, not in the first instance represent the connecting of different technical systems. Instead it will represent a more flexible way of handling a new situation – to combine different entities and components for more complex tasks. One of its main duties will be peace-keeping international contributions. Another task will be to handle attacks realised with nerve-gas or bacteria. High-technological data-virus should also be possible to combat.

The building up of such a defence will demand an entirely new way of thinking regarding decision-making, command and control and use of modern technology. Internationally, this kind of thinking has attracted great interest and got the designation “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The term is based on a number of technological breakthroughs which have occurred after the end of the cold war about 1990. In several ways, these have changed the ground for modern warfare. Here the most important achievements have been the information-technological progresses which will permit the use of lots of sensors and the capability to transfer and manage big information-flows. Realistic training with the aid of virtual three-dimensional computer scenarios (“Battlefield Computer Games”), has signified a pronounced increase in the combat-skill of tank-crews.

Some important trends within the RMA-concept is presented below:

Unmanned fighting vehicles and aircrafts. Automated, computerized technology will replace drivers and pilots. Start navigation, interpreting of the surrounding world, target-interpretation, target combatting and possible landing, is handled completely automatic. The opportunity of human handling and target combats remain. No consideration regarding the weight of the pilot, G-forces and life-supporting systems is necessary. The construction can be lighter, stronger, more rapid and cheaper. The instruction time can be shorter.

Data-streams, threat-analyses and military preparedness. Miniaturized networks of cheap sensors deliver data from areas which earlier have not been accessible. Immediate processing creates information which is distributed via coded broadband to all units needing it.

Chemical, bacteriological, radiological detection and protection. Micro sensors integrated in new protective clothes will dramatically increase the ability to move and increase freedom of action in contaminated areas. High sensibility and selectivity will make possible an immediate detection of the threat.

Body-armour for fighting soldiers. Extremely strong and light bullet proof materials increase the survival on the battlefield.

Field-equipment of lightweight type. New, lightweight materials will decrease the total carrying load for the soldier. Hence endurance and strength will increase. This holds well for uniforms, personal weapons, communication equipment and darkness-optics.

New bio-treatment for augmented performance. Without the use of drugs, human staying power can be doubled. Lack of sleep and impaired vigilance now can be compensated for as well as the impact of physical damage.

A science of command and control

Today's military command and control embrace different kinds of affairs from battle conduct to more administrative activities. It takes place on different strata from lower tactical levels to the highest strategical level. In contrast to civil command and control it includes fundamental questions regarding life and death for involved persons. In battlefields the unmasked principle of causality always rules. There the connection between conclusions and orders and their consequences are terrifyingly short.

A simple definition of the aim of command and control could be the coordination of human actions with different resources to get effects. In practise, this is often considered as something diffuse. Difficulties often arise when analysing the content and form of the activity. Problem solutions too often are seen as applied science without either theories or scientific method. Obstacles to attain a comprehensive view with hitherto used frames of reference have been experienced by both commanders and military theorists.

With this background, an attempt to regard command and control as part of “The Art of War” may be understandable. As an art, it can only be developed and reach its fulfilment inside the born leader with his special creativity, intuition capability and the divine vestige, existing in very few persons. However, such a view will have some less successful consequences, especially for the education of higher commanders. The divine vestige is scarcely possible to gauge and the number of born leaders is not in enough supply for the demands of society. At all events it cannot be the foundation for the recruitment of general staff candidates. Here more measurable and tangible properties must be decisive.

A more fruitful attitude therefore has appeared to be an integration of the problems of military management into a general scientific educational frame and denote it a science of command and control. The military competent at once realise that this area has two central questions at issue, on the one hand to make relevant decisions and on the other to carry them out adequately. With a slight reformulation it is possible to say that decision-making is to determine what should be done. The realization, the command, concerns how it should be done. Here the continuous existing aspect of time is present with its deadlines for thinking, planning, decision-making, taking measures, etc. This kind of activity always embraces the old truism of the equal importance of making the right things as doing things right. Regarding civil decision-making and execution, it often differs marginally (in principle) from the military counterpart. Thus, it is possible to speak of a general science of command and control.

In English, the area is denoted by the words command, control, communication and information with the acronym C3I. Command implies goal-oriented conduct and action, executed by people over people who all are living creatures and thereby process information for their survival. The process of life is to adapt the own situation to an ever-changing environment and a relation between information and control. Control comprises the processing of information, programming, decision and communication. Two-way communication between the controller and the controlled feeds back the result of the action for necessary justification and new activity.

In reality, the described control and command process is a very complex phenomenon. The physical and mental status of the decision-maker as well as deeply existing conceptions and preferences influence the procedure. Also organisational structures and technical equipment will influence the result. “Everything is connected to everything else”. Later in the text, it will be evident that the used English keywords can represent subsets of a comprehensive theory. Without this theory the term science in the label “A science of command and control” should be irrelevant.

To synthesize a new subject field like command and control will imply the finding and understanding of the joint factors existing within different kinds of the area. It also demands definitions regarding basic terms and concepts as a starting point for problem-solving and various kinds of reasoning. Below some fundamental concept are presented.

The theory of command and control is founded on a number of related academic areas. The integration of these creates the theoretical basis which allows a commander to understand the function of command and control. That is to master the prerequisite for relevant decisions and their transformation into reality.

The science of command and control is the application of the theory in a real world. It indicates how a system of command and control should be designed and used for decision-making, execution, followup, and government in a mainly unpredictable and chaotic environment (especially the combat).

A system of command and control is an integrated gathering of people, functions, procedures and equipment which together constitute the function of command and control. This system is the tool of the commander and secures that the capacity of the directed unity is utilized in the best manner in order to fulfill the goal.

The research problem of the science of command and control can be formulated as: How should the intentions of the commander be converted into reality as completely as possible?

Something which must be elucidated in the definitions above is the concept of a commander. The presumption that one can count with an unambiguous, conclusive commander as in military units, civil service departments or oil-tankers are not always correct. A committee, a board or some kind of collective often is the equivalent. This must be considered the rule when controversial political problems should be solved.

The concept of a commander implies that somebody (sometimes several) can formulate a criterion for the best problem solution and take the responsibility for a decision. Likewise that this (or these) people finally shoulder the responsibility for execution even if this can be transferred to other instances.

Today a science of command and control is necessary to adapt managing power and exercise of command to new kinds of organisations and new operational principles. The area is transformed at a rapid pace by social changes and new trends like the internationalisation of economies and knowledge production, globalization of media and knowledge mediation and also changed forms of cooperation and conflicts.

Moreover, modern leadership is often executed at a distance which implies both possibilities and risks. Today's communication technology will permit operations (both surgical and military!) to be literally managed and controlled from the other side of the globe. Modern dispersed organisations thus have their specific problems which cannot be neglected. How should social relations be managed when the personal encounter becomes a rare event and directors are dematerialized to a voice in a satellite-mediated phone call?

Regarding military command and control systems, they are today typically multi-component phenomena. The deciding functions are performed by people, simple decision-support systems in computer-based algorithms and advanced expert-systems. The decision-components are geographically dispersed dependent on the appearance of the environment but also for reason of survival. This distributed system gets its character by the quality of the sensors together with velocity and effectiveness of actual weapons.

The need for a comprehensive theory

For the military scientist it is obvious that studies in such a complex area as command and control scarcely are possible without the help of a theory of generalization, a meta-theory. Such a theory must be able to sum up and explain common factors and problems existing in all kinds of command and control. It must also be able to integrate different knowledge and reflections from various subject fields, which apparently do not seem to be related. In addition it must preferably furnish a hierarchy of theories and models where key-variables and their changes are intelligible and measurable. The supply of relevant models to facilitate studies, simulations and calculations defines the limits for both knowledge acquisition and information-dispersal.

A meta-theory likewise must supply general definitions and a common language, joining all subareas which taken together, will constitute a science of command and control. The application must take place in an area which has an ever growing need for rapid decisions and the mastering of very complex processes despite tight margins, ambiguous and disturbed information. As a frame of reference it must also be able to answer the same questions like other scientific areas, namely:

what theories represent the core of the field?

which methods are used?

which sources are used? and

to what extent are these theories, methods and sources universally applicable?

Does such a theory exist? From the viewpoint of the systems-scientist, the answer is affirmative. General Systems Theory (GST) studies patterns which do not relate to a specific area. It examines generalizations, applicable on specific problems, e.g. in command and control. As meta-discipline it can transfer its knowledge-structure to other areas without calling in question their content. It can supplement a great number of areas and integrate phenomena which had not been successfully handled. Above all this theory will support the generalist, who often is found to solve today's problem better than the specialist with his narrow limits.

A popular formulation could be that systems theory creates a knowledge structure which facilitates the providing of fact to the right place and creates possibilities to see a connected whole. A locution is that its main task is to help scientists to elucidate the complexity of the existence, technologists to make use of it and generalists to learn to live with it.

#### The alternative is to reject linear scenario planning in favor of complex theoretical analysis—unconditionally inserting complexity analysis into the simulation creates better policy planning

Rosenau, professor emeritus of international affairs – George Washington University, ‘97

(James, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

In short, there are strict limits within which theorizing based on the premises of complexity theory must be confined. It cannot presently—and is unlikely ever to— provide a method for predicting particular events and specifying the exact shape and nature of developments in the future. As one observer notes, it is a theory "meant for thought experiments rather than for emulation of real systems."18

Consequently, it is when our panacean impulses turn us toward complexity theory for guidance in the framing of exact predictions that the policy payoffs are least likely to occur and our disillusionment is most likely to intensify. For the strides that complexity theorists have made with their mathematical models and computer simulations are still a long way from amounting to a science that can be relied upon for precision in charting the course of human affairs that lies ahead. Although their work has demonstrated the existence of an underlying order, it has also called attention to a variety of ways in which the complexity of that order can collapse into pervasive disorder. Put differently, while human affairs have both linear and nonlinear dimensions, and while there is a range of conditions in which the latter dimensions are inoperative or "well behaved,"19 it is not known when or where the nonlinear dimensions will appear and trigger inexplicable feedback mechanisms. Such unknowns lead complexity theorists to be as interested in patterns of disorder as those of order, an orientation that is quite contrary to the concerns of policy makers.

Theorizing Within the Limits

To acknowledge the limits of complexity theory, however, is not to assert that it is of no value for policy makers and academics charged with comprehending world affairs. Far from it: if the search for panaceas is abandoned and replaced with a nuanced approach, it quickly becomes clear that the underlying premises of complexity theory have a great deal to offer as a perspective or world view with which to assess and anticipate the course of events. Perhaps most notably, they challenge prevailing assumptions in both the academic and policy-making communities that political, economic, and social relationships adhere to patterns traced by linear regressions. Complexity theory asserts that it is not the case, as all too many officials and analysts presume, that "we can get a value for the whole by adding up the values of its parts."20 In the words of one analyst, Look out the nearest window. Is there any straight line out there that wasn’t man-made? I’ve been asking the same question of student and professional groups for several years now, and the most common answer is a grin. Occasionally a philosophical person will comment that even the lines that look like straight lines are not straight lines if we look at them through a microscope. But even if we ignore that level of analysis, we are still stuck with the inevitable observation that natural structures are, at their core, nonlinear. If [this] is true, why do social scientists insist on describing human events as if all the rules that make those events occur are based on straight lines?21

A complexity perspective acknowledges the nonlinearity of both natural and human systems. It posits human systems as constantly learning, reacting, adapting, and changing even as they persist, as sustaining continuity and change simultaneously. It is a perspective that embraces non-equilibrium existence. Stated more generally, it is a mental set, a cast of mind that does not specify particular outcomes or solutions but that offers guidelines and lever points that analysts and policy makers alike can employ to more clearly assess the specific problems they seek to comprehend or resolve. Furthermore, the complexity perspective does not neglect the role of history even though it rejects the notion that a single cause has a single effect. Rather, focusing as it does on initial conditions and the paths that they chart for systems, complexity treats the historical context of situations as crucial to comprehension.

The first obstacle to adopting a complexity perspective is to recognize that inevitably we operate with some kind of theory. It is sheer myth to believe that we need merely observe the circumstances of a situation in order to understand them. Facts do not speak for themselves; observers give them voice by sorting out those that are relevant from those that are irrelevant and, in so doing, they bring a theoretical perspective to bear. Whether it be realism, liberalism, or pragmatism, analysts and policy makers alike must have some theoretical orientation if they are to know anything. Theory provides guidelines; it sensitizes observers to alternative possibilities; it highlights where levers might be pulled and influence wielded; it links ends to means and strategies to resources; and perhaps most of all, it infuses context and pattern into a welter of seemingly disarrayed and unrelated phenomena.

It follows that the inability of complexity theory to make specific predictions is not a serious drawback. Understanding and not prediction is the task of theory. It provides a basis for grasping and anticipating the general patterns within which specific events occur. The weather offers a good example. It cannot be precisely predicted at any moment in time, but there are building blocks—fronts, highs and lows, jet streams, and so on—and our overall understanding of changes in weather has been much advanced by theory based on these building blocks....We understand the larger patterns and (many of) their causes, though the detailed trajectory through the space of weather possibilities is perpetually novel. As a result, we can do far better than the old standby: predict that "tomorrow’s weather will be like today’s" and you stand a 60 percent probability of being correct. A relevant theory for [complex adaptive systems] should do at least as well.22 Given the necessity of proceeding from a theoretical standpoint, it ought not be difficult to adopt a complexity perspective. Indeed, most of us have in subtle ways already done so. Even if political analysts are not—as I am not—tooled up in computer science and mathematics, the premises of complexity theory and the strides in comprehension they have facilitated are not difficult to grasp. Despite our conceptual insufficiencies, we are not helpless in the face of mounting complexity. Indeed, as the consequences of turbulent change have become more pervasive, so have observers of the global scene become increasingly wiser about the ways of the world and, to a large degree, we have become, each of us in our own way, complexity theorists. Not only are we getting accustomed to a fragmegrative world view that accepts contradictions, anomalies, and dialectic processes, but we have also learned that situations are multiply caused, that unintended consequences can accompany those that are intended, that seemingly stable situations can topple under the weight of cumulated grievances, that some situations are ripe for accidents waiting to happen, that expectations can be self-fulfilling, that organizational decisions are driven as much by informal as formal rules, that feedback loops can redirect the course of events, and so on through an extensive list of understandings that appear so commonplace as to obscure their origins in the social sciences only a few decades ago.23 Indeed, we now take for granted that learning occurs in social systems, that systems in crisis are vulnerable to sharp turns of directions precipitated by seemingly trivial incidents, that the difference between times one and two in any situation can often be ascribed to adaptive processes, that the surface appearance of societal tranquillity can mask underlying problems, and that "other things being equal" can be a treacherous phrase if it encourages us to ignore glaring exceptions. In short, we now know that history is not one damn thing after another so much as it is many damn things simultaneously.

And if we ever slip in our understanding of these subtle lessons, if we ever unknowingly revert to simplistic formulations, complexity theory serves to remind us there are no panaceas. It tells us that there are limits to how much we can comprehend of the complexity that pervades world affairs, that we have to learn to become comfortable living and acting under conditions of uncertainty.

The relevance of this accumulated wisdom—this implicit complexity perspective—can be readily illustrated. It enables us to grasp how an accidental drowning in Hong Kong intensified demonstrations against China, how the opening of a tunnel in Jerusalem could give rise to a major conflagration, how the death of four young girls can foster a "dark and brooding" mood in Brussels, how an "October surprise" might impact strongly on an American presidential election, or how social security funds will be exhausted early in the next century unless corrective policies are adopted—to cite three recent events and two long-standing maxims.24 We know, too that while the social security example is different from the others—in that it is founded on a linear projection of demographic change while the other examples involve nonlinear feedback loops—the world is comprised of linear as well as nonlinear dynamics and that this distinction is central to the kind of analysis we undertake.

In other words, while it is understandable that we are vulnerable to the appeal of panaceas, this need not be the case. Our analytic capacities and concepts are not so far removed from complexity theorists that we need be in awe of their accomplishments or be ready to emulate their methods. Few of us have the skills or resources to undertake sophisticated computer simulations—and that may even be an advantage, as greater technical skills might lead us to dismiss complexity theory as inapplicable—but as a philosophical perspective complexity theory is not out of our reach. None of its premises and concepts are alien to our analytic habits. They sum to a perspective that is consistent with our own and with the transformations that appear to be taking the world into unfamiliar realms. Hence, through its explication, the complexity perspective can serve as a guide both to comprehending a fragmegrated world and theorizing within its limits.

## Relations

#### Multiple alt causes prove embargo wouldn’t be enough to solve relations in all of Latin America

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WASHINGTON, Apr 11 2012 (IPS) - Relations between the United States and Latin America have “grown more distant” in importance part due to the latter’s persistent disagreement with U.S. policies on immigration, drugs, and Cuba, according to a new report released here Wednesday on the eve of this year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. “The United States must regain credibility in the region by dealing seriously with an unfinished agenda of problems, including immigration, drugs, and Cuba – that stands in the way of a real partnership,” according to Michael Shifter, president of the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue (IAD).¶ The [20-page report](http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReport%20FINAL.pdf), entitled “Remaking the Relationship”, described current inter-American relations as “generally cordial but lack(ing) in vigor and purpose”. It suggested that Washington, in particular, has failed to fully come to terms with Latin America’s strong economic and political progress over the past two decades.¶ It also concluded that the two sides “need to do more to exploit the enormous untapped opportunities of their relationship in economics, trade, and energy”, as well as to work more closely together on global and regional problems.¶ “They need to breathe new life and vigor into hemispheric relations,” it stressed.¶ “If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away,” the report warned. “The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemispheric-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity.”¶ Coming on the eve of the Cartagena Summit, where many of these same issues are expected to claim centre-stage, the report represents as much of a consensus of elite opinion in both Americas as can be found.¶ Washington’s 40-year-old drug war and its impacts on the region will be major agenda item as a result of an unprecedented push by Latin American leaders to use the forum to discuss alternative strategies that could reduce the level of violence associated with drug trafficking.¶ Most of IAD’s members endorsed the report; there was only one partial dissent – by a former Latin America aide in the George H.W. Bush administration who objected to the report’s suggestion that legalisation of some drugs or decriminalisation could offer viable alternative solutions to dealing with illicit drug trafficking and the violence associated with it in many Latin American countries.¶ Founded 30 years ago, IAD’s membership includes 100 prominent figures divided roughly evenly between U.S. nationals, including one former president (Jimmy Carter) and numerous former cabinet officials and lawmakers from both Democratic and Republican administrations, on the one hand, and leading personalities from Canada, the Caribbean, and Latin Americans, including Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Ricardo Lagos, and Ernesto Zedillo, and nine other former Latin American presidents, on the other.¶ IAD is co-chaired by former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet and former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills.¶ In addition to leading politicians, members also include important business figures, heads of civil society organisations (CSOs), academics, and former top managers of multilateral or hemispheric organisations, including the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, the Organisation of American States ([OAS](http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/04/us-latin-america-growing-more-distant-warns-think-tank/)), and the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), among others.¶ Latin America’s recent advances in reducing poverty and inequality, consolidating democratic practices, and establishing promising new ties with countries like China and India contrasts favourably, according to the report, with Washington’s travails resulting from its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2008 financial crisis, growing inequality and political gridlock.¶ As a result, “(m)ost countries of the (Latin American) region view the United States as less and less relevant to their needs – and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them,” it said.¶ Moreover, Washington’s failure to deal effectively with three longstanding irritants to inter-American relations – immigration, drug policy, and Cuba – has hardly helped, the report noted.¶ The report noted that Washington’s **failure to achieve meaningful immigration reform** – the result, to a great extent, of its increasingly divisive politics – “**is breeding resentment across the region**, nowhere more so than in …Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.”¶ Recent signs that immigration from Mexico, in particular, has levelled off should, according to the report, offer an opportunity for U.S. policy makers to revise their views.¶ On drugs, the report called it “critical” that Washington respond to growing calls by Latin American leaders, most recently by Mexican President Felipe Calderon, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, and Guatemala’s new president, Otto Perez, to consider alternative strategies, such as regulated legalisation of marijuana and decriminalisation of mere possession of certain drugs.¶ The report endorsed similar conclusions reached by the 2009 Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, which was chaired by Cardoso, Zedillo, and former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria.¶ It said these alternatives, as well as staunching “the flow of dangerous arms southward from the United States” by drug cartels and enhanced U.S. support for national efforts at rehabilitating and re- integrating criminals and other migrants repatriated by Washington to their home countries, should serve as a “starting point for an honest U.S.-Latin American dialogue on the drug question”.¶ On Cuba, the only country whose head of state, at Washington’s insistence, has not been invited to Cartegena, the report asserted that Washington’s 50-year-old embargo “has not worked and, in fact, may have been counter-productive, prolonging Cuba’s repressive rule rather than ending it.”¶ Washington, it said, “needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba,” while its “authoritarian regime” should be urged by its Latin and Caribbean neighbours to institute democratic reform.¶ On the more positive side, the report said “expanded trade, investment and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust U.S.-Latin American relations” and that “intensive economic engagement by the United States may be the best foundation for wider partnerships across many issues as well as the best way to energize currently listless U.S. relations with the region.”¶ While the U.S. share of the Latin American market has diminished in recent years, its exports – now greater in value than its exports to Europe – have been growing “at an impressive pace”.¶ The report noted that the ratification of long-pending free trade accords with Colombia and Panama offer a good start, but that Washington should also seek a “broader framework for U.S. economic relations with Latin America,” despite the failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to gain any traction.¶ The growing global influence of Latin America, particularly Brazil and Mexico, also calls for greater cooperation and consultation with the region’s leaders on global issues, including nuclear non- proliferation and climate change, according to the report.¶ It also commended Washington for its accommodation of new regional institutions, such as UNASUR, that currently exclude the U.S., but also suggested the two sides also focus in reforming the hemisphere’s oldest regional grouping, the Organisation of American States, particularly given its importance in establishing democratic norms.

#### Democratization doesn’t solve war

Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs – Georgetown University, April ‘11

(Charles A, “Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out,” <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07977.pdf>)

Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy is not a necessary condition for stable peace. Although liberal democracies appear to be better equipped to fashion zones of peace due to their readiness to institu­tionalize strategic restraint and their more open societies – an attribute that advantages societal integration and narrative/identity change – regime type is a poor predic­tor of the potential for enemies to become friends. The Concert of Europe was divided between two liberalizing countries (Britain and France) and three absolute monar­chies (Russia, Prussia, and Austria), but nevertheless pre­served peace in Europe for almost four decades. Gen-eral Suharto was a repressive leader at home, but after taking power in 1966 he nonetheless guided Indonesia toward peace with Malaysia and played a leading role in the founding of ASEAN. Brazil and Argentina embarked down the path to peace in 1979 – when both countries were ruled by military juntas. These findings indicate that non-democracies can be reliable partners in peace and make clear that the United States, the EU, and de­mocracies around the world should choose enemies and friends on the basis of other states’ foreign policy behav-ior, not the nature of their domestic institutions.

#### No impact to warming

Taylor 12 (James, Forbes energy and environment writer, 3/14/2012, "Shock Poll: Meteorologists Are Global Warming Skeptics", www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2012/03/14/shock-poll-meteorologists-are-global-warming-skeptics/)

A recent survey of American Meteorological Society members shows meteorologists are skeptical that humans are causing a global warming crisis. The survey confirms what many scientists have been reporting for years; the politically focused bureaucratic leadership of many science organizations is severely out of touch with the scientists themselves regarding global warming issues. According to American Meteorological Society (AMS) data, 89% of AMS meteorologists believe global warming is happening, but only a minority (30%) is very worried about global warming. This sharp contrast between the large majority of meteorologists who believe global warming is happening and the modest minority who are nevertheless very worried about it is consistent with other scientist surveys. This contrast exposes global warming alarmists who assert that 97% of the world’s scientists agree humans are causing a global warming crisis simply because these scientists believe global warming is occurring. However, as this and other scientist surveys show, believing that some warming is occurring is not the same as believing humans are causing a worrisome crisis. Other questions solidified the meteorologists’ skepticism about humans creating a global warming crisis. For example, among those meteorologists who believe global warming is happening, only a modest majority (59%) believe humans are the primary cause. More importantly, only 38% of respondents who believe global warming is occurring say it will be very harmful during the next 100 years. With substantially fewer than half of meteorologists very worried about global warming or expecting substantial harm during the next 100 years, one has to wonder why environmental activist groups are sowing the seeds of global warming panic. Does anyone really expect our economy to be powered 100 years from now by the same energy sources we use today? Why immediately, severely, and permanently punish our economy with costly global warming restrictions when technological advances and the free market will likely address any such global warming concerns much more efficiently, economically and effectively? In another line of survey questions, 53% of respondents believe there is conflict among AMS members regarding the topic of global warming. Only 33% believe there is no conflict. Another 15% were not sure. These results provide strong refutation to the assertion that “the debate is over.” Interestingly, only 26% of respondents said the conflict among AMS members is unproductive. Overall, the survey of AMS scientists paints a very different picture than the official AMS Information Statement on Climate Change. Drafted by the AMS bureaucracy, the Information Statement leaves readers with the impression that AMS meteorologists have few doubts about humans creating a global warming crisis. The Information Statement indicates quite strongly that humans are the primary driver of global temperatures and the consequences are and will continue to be quite severe. Compare the bureaucracy’s Information Statement with the survey results of the AMS scientists themselves. Scientists who have attended the Heartland Institute’s annual International Conference on Climate Change report the same disconnect throughout their various science organizations; only a minority of scientists believes humans are causing a global warming crisis, yet the non-scientist bureaucracies publish position statements that contradict what the scientists themselves believe. Few, if any, of these organizations actually poll their members before publishing a position statement. Within this context of few actual scientist surveys, the AMS survey results are very powerful.

#### No risk of nuclear terror

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

## Multilateralism

#### Plan doesn’t solve perception

Hanson ‘09associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org 2009 Stephanie “US Cuba Relations” Council on Foreign Relations 4/14 <http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03412.pdf>

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say there is a long process that would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the InterAmerican Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term. ¶ Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to include provisions easing travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. These provisions passed in a March 10 vote. "Whatever we call it--normalization, detente, rapproachement--I think it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

#### 8 point font concedes alt causes – Guantanamo, Kyoto, Bali conference, the ICC, and human rights treaties

Burgsdorff—their author—9**–** Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>)

6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together **with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.**

#### Multilateral efforts terminally fail - plan can't solve the system

Barma et al. 13

Naazneen Barma is an assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Ely Ratner is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Steven Weber is a professor of political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, The National Interest, March/April 2013, "The Mythical Liberal Order", http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146

Not only have we seen this movie before, but it seems to be on repeat. Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international cooperation on significant issues. Global governance is in a serious drought—palpable across the full range of crucial, mounting international challenges that include nuclear proliferation, climate change, international development and the global financial crisis.

Where exactly is the liberal world order that so many Western observers talk about? Today we have an international political landscape that is neither orderly nor liberal.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In the envisaged liberal world order, the “rise of the rest” should have been a boost to global governance. A rebalancing of power and influence should have made international politics more democratic and multilateral action more legitimate, while bringing additional resources to bear. Economic integration and security-community enlargement should have started to envelop key players as the system built on itself through network effects—by making the benefits of joining the order (and the costs of opposing it) just a little bit greater for each new decision. Instead, the world has no meaningful deal on climate change; no progress on a decade-old global-trade round and no inclination toward a new one; no coherent response to major security issues around North Korea, Iran and the South China Sea; and no significant coordinated effort to capitalize on what is possibly the best opportunity in a generation for liberal progress—the Arab Spring.

It’s not particularly controversial to observe that global governance has gone missing. What matters is why. The standard view is that we’re seeing an international liberal order under siege, with emerging and established powers caught in a contest for the future of the global system that is blocking progress on global governance. That mental map identifies the central challenge of American foreign policy in the twenty-first century as figuring out how the United States and its allies can best integrate rising powers like China into the prevailing order while bolstering and reinforcing its foundations.

But this narrative and mental map are wrong. The liberal order can’t be under siege in any meaningful way (or prepped to integrate rising powers) because it never attained the breadth or depth required to elicit that kind of agenda. The liberal order is today still largely an aspiration, not a description of how states actually behave or how global governance actually works. The rise of a configuration of states that six years ago we called a “World Without the West” is not so much challenging a prevailing order as it is exposing the inherent frailty of the existing framework.

This might sound like bad news for American foreign policy and even worse news for the pursuit of global liberalism, but it doesn’t have to be so. Advancing a normative liberal agenda in the twenty-first century is possible but will require a new approach. Once strategists acknowledge that the liberal order is more or less a myth, they can let go of the anxious notion that some countries are attacking or challenging it, and the United States can be liberated from the burden of a supposed obligation to defend it. We can instead focus on the necessary task of building a liberal order from the ground up.

Loyalists are quick to defend the concept of a robust liberal order by falling back on outdated metrics of success. The original de minimis aims of the postwar order achieved what now should be considered a low bar: preventing a third world war and a race-to-the-bottom closure of the global-trade regime. Beyond that, the last seventy years have certainly seen movement toward globalization of trade and capital as well as some progress on human rights—but less clearly as a consequence of anything like a liberal world order than as a consequence of national power and interest.

What would a meaningful liberal world order actually look like if it were operating in practice? Consider an objective-based definition: a world in which most countries most of the time follow rules that contribute to progressively more collective security, shared economic gains and individual human rights. States would gradually downplay the virtues of relative advantage and self-reliance. Most states would recognize that foreign-policy choices are constrained (to their aggregate benefit) by multilateral institutions, global norms and nonstate actors. They would cede meaningful bits of sovereign authority in exchange for proactive collaboration on universal challenges. And they would accept that economic growth is best pursued through integration, not mercantilism, and is in turn the most reliable source of national capacity, advancement and influence. With those ingredients in place, we would expect to see the gradual, steady evolution of something resembling an “international community” bound by rights and responsibilities to protect core liberal values of individual rights and freedoms.

No wonder proponents of the liberal-world-order perspective hesitate to offer precise definitions of it. Few of these components can reasonably be said to have been present for any length of time at a global level in the post–World War II world. There may be islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different. Moreover, the vectors today are mostly pointing away from the direction of a liberal world order.

HOW DID we get here? Consider two founding myths of liberal internationalism. The first is that expressions of post–World War II American power and leadership were synonymous with the maturation of a liberal order. The narrative should sound familiar: The United States wins World War II and controls half of global GDP. The United States constructs an international architecture aimed at promoting an open economic system and a semi-institutionalized approach to fostering cooperation on security and political affairs. And the United States provides the essential global public goods—an extended security deterrent and the global reserve currency—to make cooperation work. Some essential elements of the system survive in a posthegemony era because the advantages to other significant powers of sustained institutionalized cooperation exceed the costs and risks of trying to change the game.

In the 1990s the narrative gets more interesting, controversial and relevant. This is when the second foundational myth of the liberal world order—that it has an inexorable magnetic attraction—comes to the fore. The end of the Cold War and the attendant rejection of Communism is supposed to benefit the liberal world order in breadth and depth: on the internal front, new capitalist democracies should converge on individuals’ market-based economic choice and election-based political choice; on the external front, the relationships among states should become increasingly governed by a set of liberal international norms that privilege and protect the civic and political freedoms that capitalist democracies promise. The liberal order’s geography should then expand to encompass the non-Western world. Its multilateral rules, institutions and norms should increase in density across economic, political and security domains. As positive network effects kick in, the system should evolve to be much less dependent on American power. It’s supposedly easier—and more beneficial—to join the liberal world order than it is to oppose it (or even to try to modify it substantially). A choice to live outside the system becomes progressively less realistic: few countries can imagine taking on the contradictions of modern governance by themselves, particularly in the face of expanding multilateral free trade and interdependent security institutions.

The story culminates in a kind of magnetic liberalism, where countries and foreign-policy decisions are attracted to the liberal world order like iron filings to a magnet. With few exceptions, U.S. foreign policy over the last two decades has been predicated on the assumption that the magnetic field is strong and getting stronger. It’s a seductive idea, but it should not be confused with reality. In practice, the magnetic field is notable mainly for its weakness. It is simply not the case today that nations feel equally a part of, answerable to or constrained by a liberal order. And nearly a quarter century after 1989, it has become disingenuous to argue that the liberal world order is simply slow in getting off the ground—as if the next gust of democratic transitions or multilateral breakthroughs will offer the needed push to revive those triumphalist moments brought on by the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the contrary, the aspirational liberal end state is receding into the horizon.

THE PICTURE half a century ago looked more promising, with the initial rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the successful establishment of NATO setting expectations about what multilateral governance could achieve. But international institutions picked off the low-hanging fruit of global cooperation decades ago and have since stalled in their attempts to respond to pressing international challenges. The 1990s served up the best possible set of conditions to advance global liberalism, but subsequent moves toward political and economic liberalization that came with the end of the Cold War were either surprisingly shallow or fragile and short-lived.

Ask yourself this: Have developing countries felt and manifested over time the increasing magnetic pull of the liberal world order? A number of vulnerable developing and post-Communist transitional countries adopted a “Washington Consensus” package of liberal economic policies—freer trade, marketization and privatization of state assets—in the 1980s and 1990s. But these adjustments mostly arrived under the shadow of coercive power. They generally placed the burden of adjustment disproportionately on the most disempowered members of society. And, with few exceptions, they left developing countries more, not less, vulnerable to global economic volatility. The structural-adjustment policies imposed in the midst of the Latin American debt crisis and the region’s subsequent “lost decade” of the 1980s bear witness to each of these shortcomings, as do the failed voucher-privatization program and consequent asset stripping and oligarchic wealth concentration experienced by Russians in the 1990s.

If these were the gains that were supposed to emerge from a liberal world order, it’s no surprise that liberalism came to have a tarnished brand in much of the developing world. The perception that economic neoliberalism fails to deliver on its trickle-down growth pledge is strong and deep. In contrast, state capitalism and resource nationalism—vulnerable to a different set of contradictions, of course—have for the moment delivered tangible gains for many emerging powers and look like promising alternative development paths. Episodic signs of pushback against some of the excesses of that model, such as anti-Chinese protests in Angola or Zambia, should not be confused with a yearning for a return to liberal prescriptions. And comparative economic performance in the wake of the global financial crisis has done nothing to burnish liberalism’s economic image, certainly not in the minds of those who saw the U.S. investment banking–led model of capital allocation as attractive, and not in the minds of those who held a vision of EU-style, social-welfare capitalism as the next evolutionary stage of liberalism.

There’s just as little evidence of sustained liberal magnetism operating in the politics of the developing world, where entrenched autocrats guarding their legitimacy frequently caricature democracy promotion as a not-very-surreptitious strategy to replace existing regimes with either self-serving instability or more servile allies of the West. In practice, the liberal order’s formula for democratic freedom has been mostly diluted down to observing electoral procedures. The results have been almost uniformly disappointing, as the legacy of post–Cold War international interventions from Cambodia to Iraq attests. Even the more organic “color revolutions” of Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century have stalled into equilibria Freedom House identifies as only “partly free”—in reality affording average citizens little access to political or economic opportunities. Only two years past the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring a similar disillusionment has set in across the Middle East, where evidence for the magnetic pull of a liberal world order is extremely hard to find.

Contemporary developments in Southeast Asia illustrate where the most important magnetic forces of change actually come from. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has successfully coordinated moves toward trade liberalization in the region, but this has not been underpinned by a set of liberal principles or collective norms. Instead, the goals have been instrumental—to protect the region from international economic volatility and to cement together some counterweight to the Chinese economy. And ASEAN is explicitly not a force for individual political and economic freedom. Indeed, it acts more like a bulwark against “interference” in internal affairs. The aspirations one occasionally hears for the organization to implement collective-governance measures come from Western observers much more frequently than from the people and states that comprise the group itself.

Global governistas will protest that the response to the global financial crisis proves that international economic cooperation is more robust than we acknowledge. In this view, multilateral financial institutions passed the stress test and prevented the world from descending into the economic chaos of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies and retaliatory currency arbitrage and capital controls. The swift recovery of global trade and capital flows is often cited as proof of the relative success of economic cooperation. The problem with this thesis is that very real fears about how the system could collapse, including the worry that states would retreat behind a mercantilist shell, are no different from what they were a hundred years ago. It’s not especially indicative of liberal progress to be having the same conversation about global economic governance that the world was having at the end of the gold-standard era and the onset of the Great Depression. Global economic governance may have helped to prevent a repeat downward spiral into self-defeating behaviors, but surely in a world order focused on liberal progress the objectives of global economic governance should have moved on by now. And the final chapter here has yet to be written. From the perspective of many outside the United States, the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented “quantitative easing” policies are not far off from monetary warfare on the exchange and inflation rates of others. Astute analysts have observed that as banks have operated more nationalistically and cautiously, the free flow of capital across borders has declined. A global climate that is at serious risk of breeding currency and trade wars is hardly conducive to the health and expansion of any liberal world order.

On matters of war and peace, the international community is fighting similar battles and for the most part experiencing similar failures to provide a system of collective security. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, more than five million people have died directly and indirectly from fifteen years of civil war and conflict. Just to the north, the international community stood by and watched a genocide in Sudan. In places more strategically important to leading nations, the outcome—as showcased in Syria—is geopolitical gridlock.

The last time the Security Council managed to agree on what seemed like serious collective action was over Libya, but both China and Russia now believe they were intentionally misled and that what was sold as a limited humanitarian mission was really a regime-change operation illegitimately authorized by the UN. This burst of multilateralism has actually made global-security governance down the road less likely. Meanwhile, international cooperation on security matters has been relegated to things like second-tier peacekeeping operations and efforts to ward off pirates equipped with machine guns and speedboats. These are worthy causes but will not move the needle on the issues that dominate the international-security agenda. And on the emerging issues most in need of forward-looking global governance—cybersecurity and unmanned aerial vehicles, for example—there are no rules and institutions in place at all, nor legitimate and credible mechanisms to devise them.

Assessed against its ability to solve global problems, the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions dissolve when the going gets tough—when member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in currency manipulations), when the distribution of costs is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a sports team that perfects exquisite plays during practice but fails to execute against an actual opponent, global-governance institutions have sputtered precisely when their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most.

WHY HAS this happened? The hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or “reengineering” the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the real challenge. A decade-long effort to revive the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-around-the-edges approach and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea and that its institutions are ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational.

The root cause of stalled global governance is simpler and more straightforward. “Multipolarization” has come faster and more forcefully than expected. Relatively authoritarian and postcolonial emerging powers have become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international consensus and, with that, multilateral institutions. It’s not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in effectiveness but also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive.

Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and legitimacy. The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se. There just wasn’t all that much liberal world order to break down in the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and powerful. They are truly distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully different way.

#### Leadership doesn’t solve war

Mastanduno, 9 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth

(Michael, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

#### No Middle East war

Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely.

Wider war

No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again.

The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique.

The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17

Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### Empirics prove

Kevin Drum, Staff Writer for the Washington Monthly, 9/9/’7

(<http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012029.php>)

Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

# 2nc

## Disad

### OV

#### Turns leadership – empirics

Rock 2k—professor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A., Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 4

It does so in either (or both) or two ways. First, by ceding strategically valuable territory or abandoning certain of its defenses, the appeaser allows the military balance to shift in favor of the potential aggressor, eroding the former’s deterrent capacity. This might be called the “material effect” of appeasement. Thus, for example, the abandonment of formidable Czech defenses in 1938 at Munich and the loss of the Czech Army in March of 1939 shifted the military balance toward Germany and rendered her attack on Poland more likely to succeed.

Second, and much more critical, is what one can term the “psychological effect” of appeasement. Specifically, it is argued that appeasement gravely weakens the credibility of deterrent threats. Once it has received inducements, the adversary refuses to accept the possibility that the government of the conciliatory state will later stand firm. It thus advances new and more far-reaching demands. When the government of the appeasing state responds to these demands by issuing a deterrent threat, it is not believe. Ultimately, deterrence fails, and the appeasing state must go to war if it wishes to defend its interests. The real tragedy of Munich, from this perspective, was not that Anglo-French concessions failed to satisfy Hitler in September of 1938—although that was bad enough—but that they encouraged him to attack Poland a year later, in blatant disregard of warnings from London and Paris that they would intervene.

#### Makes Obama look ridiculous – internal-link turns the advantage

Morris ‘9 – Dick, former political adviser to Sen. Trent Lott and President Bill Clinton, “Obama's Weakness Issue”, June 24 of 2009, Real Clear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/24/obamas\_weakness\_issue\_97145.html

The transparent appeasement of Iran's government -- and its obvious lack of reciprocation -- make Obama look ridiculous. Long after the mullahs have suppressed what limited democracy they once allowed, Obama's image problems will persist.

While Americans generally applaud Obama's outreach to the Muslims of the world and think highly of his Cairo speech, they are very dissatisfied with his inadequate efforts to stop Iran from developing -- and North Korea from using -- nuclear weapons. Clearly, his policies toward these two nations are a weak spot in his reputation.

His failure to stand up to either aggressor is of a piece with his virtual surrender in the war on terror.

### UQ

#### Their ev is political hype – Obama’s hardcore

Mataconis ’12 – Doug, B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University and J.D. from George Mason University School of Law, “The GOP’s Ridiculous Appeasement Argument”, 1/3, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/the-gops-ridiculous-appeasement-argument/

This isn’t really entirely new, of course. For three years now, Republicans have been accusing the President of “apologizing for America,” even though it’s a manifestly untrue assertion. More recently, many on the right have engaged in the ridiculous task of accusing the President of abandoning Hosni Mubarak last February during the height of the protests in Tahrir Square, thus “losing” Egypt. Much of it is partisan nonsense, of course, but the idea has become such an article of faith among conservatives that it’s pretty clear that people have a hard time differentiating between facts and partisan rhetoric.

As Ted Galen Carpenter notes in a piece that appeared last week, though, the facts simply don’t support the argument that Republicans are making:

The appeasement allegations directed against Obama, though, border on bizarre. And the president fired back at his opponents, suggesting that they ask Osama Bin Laden and the twenty-two other high-level al-Qaeda operatives who have been killed since Obama took office whether he is an appeaser. Fox News host Sean Hannity immediately sneered that Obama merely cited “his one foreign policy success.” By success, Hannity implicitly meant an uncompromising, hard-line policy.

But even by that dubious standard, the Republican appeasement charge is misguided. The current bastardized definition of appeasement implies a weak-kneed willingness to make far-reaching, unwise concessions to aggressors. That certainly does not describe the current occupant of the Oval Office. After all, Obama sharply escalated the war in Afghanistan, has led efforts to impose harsher economic sanctions on Iran, adopted a hostile stance regarding China’s ambitious territorial claims in the South China Sea and served as the godfather of NATO’s military campaign to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. That’s not exactly a record reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain.

#### Hardline toward Cuba now

Kovalik ’13 – Dan, Senior Associate with the AFL-CIO, Citing Lamrani, a US-Cuba relations expert, “Trying to Destroy the Danger of a Good Example: The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba” 6/28/13 <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/>

Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts.

Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting:

Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cuba’s economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island.

The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade. He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place.

In addition, we must support Venezuela and its new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in its international medical mission. And indeed, one of the first things President Maduro did once elected in April was to travel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for these efforts. It should be noted that Maduro’s electoral rival, Henrique Capriles – who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy in Caracas during the 2002 coup — vowed to end support for, and joint work, with Cuba.

#### No rapprochement – appeasement is fundamentally incompatible with the political landscape

**Hanson and Lee ’13** – Stephanie and Brianna, Senior Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-Cuba Relations" January 31, 2013 <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113>

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term.¶ Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig. A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

### Link

#### Plan seen as global weakness

Perales ’10 - José Raúl, Senior Program Associate at the Wilson Center, “The United States and Cuba:

Implications of an Economic Relationship”, August, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf>

The U.S. embargo may need to be changed; however Sánchez vehemently opposed its complete elimination. The Helms-Burton Act created a clear roadmap stipulating the conditions by which the embargo could be suspended and ended. These include: legalization of political activity, the release of all political prisoners, dissolution of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior’s Department of State Security, establishment of an independent judiciary, and a government that does not include the Castro brothers. Only when these conditions are met and democracy is reestablished should the embargo be scrapped. Elimination of the embargo prior to meeting these conditions will rightly be perceived as weakness in the face of political pressure. For instance, the Obama administration has little intention of signing a free trade agreement with Colombia—a staunch ally with whom the United States has a very positive economic relationship—because of concern over the country’s inadequate labor rights. Imagine the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy were it to punish a consolidated democracy with strong, albeit imperfect, labor rights, yet capitulate and reward the Cuban government for systematically abusing labor rights. What sort of message would that send to the world?

#### Years of work have gone into pressuring reform in Cuba. Backing out damages U.S. reputation irreparably

Castañeda ‘8 – Jorge Castañeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America Foundation, September-October 2008, “Morning in Latin America,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5

Over the past few decades, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Latin America have patiently constructed a regional legal framework to defend and encourage democratic rule as well as respect for human rights in the hemisphere. These values have been enshrined in conventions, charters, and free trade-agreements, from the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the American Convention on Human Rights and the labor and environmental chapters of flee-trade agreements, as well as in the democratic clauses of the economic agreements between Chile and the EU and between Mexico and the EU. These mechanisms are not perfect, and they have not truly been tested. But to waive them in the interests of simply guaranteeing stability in Cuba and ensuring an exodus-free succession instead of a democratic transition--that is, creating once again a "Cuban exception" for reasons of pure pragmatism--would be unworthy of the enormous efforts every country in the hemisphere has made to deepen and strengthen democracy in the Americas. Cuba must return to the regional concert of powers, but accepting this concert's rules. To allow it to proceed otherwise would weaken democracy and encourage authoritarian traditions in the hemisphere--and lay the groundwork for other exceptions that would justify their existence by invoking the Cuban precedent.

## Relations

### Democracy

#### Multiple major conflicts disprove DPT

Rosato 11

Sebastian, Dept of Political Science at Notre Dame. “The Handbook on the Political Economy of War”, Google Books

Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet his suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Layne (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United States was not a state but a union of states, and lhat this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim. The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993, pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of the democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal slate prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that are currently coded as having been 'liberal\* during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle\*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up to scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out, foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mearsheimer 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an important exception to the finding.

#### Global democracy is impossible

Dixon 10 [Dr. Patrick Dixon, PhD Foreign Policy, “The Truth About the War With Iraq”, http://www.globalchange.com/iraqwar.htm]

And so we find an interesting fact: those who live in democratic nations, who uphold democracy as the only honourable form of [government](http://www.globalchange.com/government-debt-expect-higher-inflation-as-secret-weapon-to-reduce-huge-liabilities.htm), are not really true democrats after all. They have little or no interest in global democracy, in a nation of nations, in seeking the common good of the whole of humanity. And it is this single fact, more than any other, this inequality of wealth and privilege in our shrinking global village, that will make it more likely that our future is dominate by terror groups, freedom fighters, justice-seekers, hell-raisers, protestors and violent agitators.

### Warming

#### Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

### Terror

#### Our statistics are for the most plausible scenarios-anything else is even less likely.

Mueller 8, John, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State, 1/1/ (<http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>)

These odds are for the most plausible scenario by means of which a terrorist group might gain a bomb: constructing one from HEU obtained through illicit means. As noted, there are other routes to a bomb: stealing a fully constructed one (or the HEU needed to make one) or being given one as a gift by a nuclear state. However, as also noted, those routes are generally conceded, even by most alarmists, to be considerably less likely than the one outlined in Table 1 to be successful for the terrorists. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increaseover time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments--there is considerable agreement, for example, that Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were ten or fifteen years ago (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 257). Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

## Multilat

### Alt Causes

#### Plan wouldn’t be **enough** – US human rights credibility and Cuban economic reform are prerequisites

Burgsdorff ‘9–Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)

**In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation** which was severely damaged by US engagements in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The perception that the US does not do its utmost to fully respect international law is an issue that renders difficult joint efforts to make the UN a meaningful instrument for acting decisively against human rights violations.2**If the US wants to act more effectively in multilateral fora** in general on human rights matters, **Washington,** as a matter of priority, **needs to restore US credibility**, thus **making human rights a more defendable key priority in international relations**. Together, the EU and US stand a far better chance of furthering democratic change and sustainable improvement of the living conditions in Cuba. It is also then that other foreign partners, notably from Latin America, could be more easily approached to engage on Cuba along commonly agreed upon agendas. A realistic scenario, however, has to consider that political change in Cuba will probably take longer and most likely be preceded by economic reform measures coming from the regime itself. Foreign actors wishing to assist in this process in a meaningful manner, are well advised to pursue a long term, incentives-based approach to both the Cuban authorities and Cuba’s emerging civil society, including the human rights defenders.

### ME War

#### a) Best prediction model

Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, policymakers should keep in mind that *the unprecedented is also unlikely* . Outliers in international behaviour do exist, but in general the past is the best guide to the future. Since the geopolitical catastrophes that pessimists expect will follow US withdrawal are all virtually without precedent, common sense should tell policymakers they are probably also unlikely to occur. Five years ago, US leaders should have realised that their implicit prediction for the aftermath of invasion - positive, creative instability in the Middle East that would set off a string of democratic dominoes - was without precedent. The policy was based more on the president's unshakeable faith in the redemptive power of democracy than on a coherent understanding of international relations. Like all faith-based policies, success would have required a miracle; in international politics, miracles are unfortunately rare. Faith is once again driving predictions of post-withdrawal Iraq, but this time it is faith in chaos and worst-case scenarios.

Secondly, imagined consequences are usually worse than what reality delivers . Human beings tend to focus on the most frightening scenarios at the expense of the most likely, and anticipate outcomes far worse than those that usually occur. This is especially true in the United States, which for a variety of reasons has consistently overestimated the dangers lurking in the international system.3 Pre-war Iraq was no exception; post-war Iraq is not likely to be either.

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## K

### OV

#### That makes strategy impossible and causes conflicts to spiral out of control—try or die for the alt because we link turn every impact

Saperstein, professor of physics and fellow – Center for Peace and Conflict Studies @ Wayne State University, ‘97

(Alvin M, “Complexity, Chaos, and National Security Policy: Metaphors or Tools?” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

The goals of the national Security policy maker are not so obvious in a Prigoginian ("Self Organizing Criticality") world. Should policy be aimed at encouraging or discouraging the creation of new nations, the breakup of the old? Should new alliances, new armies, new bones of contention be anticipated? All of these are the possible system elements and interactions (between the elements) which may arise and evolve via the life of the system. It is now clear that all of these SOC possibilities must be anticipated as well as the vagaries of dealing with the usual interactions between the Newtonian elements of longlived nation’s and alliances. For example, should the "West" have encouraged the breakup of Yugoslavia? (There is a long history of eastern European people living at peace with each other in strongly ruled, multinational, non-democratic States.) Are we better off competing with oppressive but strong oligarchies or dealing with fragmented—even worse, fractal—democracies?20

One of the prime reasons for our failure to successfully deal with Iraq—a "sovereign" element in the Newtonian system—is that we fear to deal with its possible break-up. Similarly, there were important confusions in our society in anticipating and dealing with the break-up of the Soviet Union. Our policies towards China have also suffered from these confusions. In the Newtonian scheme-of-things, nations are sovereign states and deal only with each others’ sovereigns. "Infringing upon sovereignty" is severely frowned upon. It is clear that we still speak to such a world, though we no longer live it.

It is not evident to me that a single metaphor/tool—like chaos—is available or useful to us in dealing with a world system characterized by "complexity." Instead of specific new tools, these metaphors can contribute to the development of the new attitudes required for the more complex modern world. They can help sharpen minds dulled by a Newtonian world view so as to be alert to all new possibilities. (It should be obvious that such alertness and openness was always present in some outstanding historic leaders whose minds were, perhaps, not so overburdened with Newtonian simplicities.) Above all, we have to be alert to (and be able to respond to) the possibility of

bifurcation21 (Fig.6a) of the existing system into very different possible worlds, containing new and different elements interacting in novel ways. Such bifurcations may occur at national levels—where nations rise and fall, where they are of interest to the strategist, and at local levels—of tactical interest, where military, governmental, or corporate units are created or destroyed. Though these bifurcations are contingent, the probabilities of their occurrence, and their outcomes, are not structureless; familiarity and insight into the fundamental aspects of the system can lead to clues as to when the probabilities of such change are large, and when they are small. Thus we shall need very flexible diplomats and soldiers at all levels.22 (The metaphors of complexity may be helpful in recruiting as well as in educating them.) They will have to be very knowledgeable about past behavior of the system and its elements—as determining the chances for radical transformation of the system. They will have to be open and adaptable to the new and novel which may confront them - with or without rational anticipation.23 Clearly, the new policy makers will have to be thoroughly cognizant of the relevant elements of anthropology, sociology, and psychology, as well as history. Knowledge of the functioning of existing governments, their departments or military units, will not be sufficient, as these elements may be bubbling-up or dissolving into the inchoate foam of people and groups below. Not only are flexibility and imagination required for attaining one’s ends in a complex system. The ends themselves will often be shifting and/or unclear. In some cases it may be desirable to fragment competing parties ("divide and conquer"—e.g., the British role in India); in other cases to consolidate them (create alliances or nations—e.g., the creation of Yugoslavia24). Of utmost importance is the recognition that the policymaker can help direct these shifts, by influencing the elements at a lower level than those of the system of interest; e.g., in a system of nations, it may be advisable to attempt to influence their individual citizens.25 So much for the sanctity of national sovereignty! In mathematical terms, the usual way of seeking the "best" solution to a problem is to look for some maximum value of a function-surface over the space of values pertinent to the problem (e.g., Axelrod and Bennett 1991). The highest maximum (or the lowest minimum) is the best solution—the desired policy—and if the surface is known, that best solution can eventually be found. However, in a "Self-Organizing Criticality" world, the act of moving over the surface in search of its maximum can radically change the surface. It will thus act more as an elastic membrane than as a fixed-function surface. Thus we may not be able to look for the "good strategy" in opposition to the "bad strategy" but may have to settle for the "contextually appropriate strategy."

Conclusion: Chaos and Complexity—Tool and/or Metaphor?

It is clear that successful military and political policy makers have always entertained the potentiality of chaos and have sought the tools of redundancy and flexibility of resources to deal with that possibility. The only new tool to deal with chaos presented here is the engineering tool of attempting to predict crisis instability and then avoid it or be prepared to live with it. Quantitative dynamical models of the system of interest may be useful in making such predictions. If they are inadequate or unavailable, verbal models have a long history, and potentiality, of use.

If the leaders of the pre-WWI European states had recognized that the railroad schedule dominated mobilization of their troops was a source of great crisis instability (Tuchman 1962, van Creveld 1989), perhaps they would have avoided starting—and being trapped by—the process. But this recognition would have required that the chaos metaphor be more commonly found in the "intellectual air" of turn-of-the-century Europe than was the case in that rapidly industrializing Newtonian-reductionist society.

Given a Newtonian paradigm, the policymaker strives to be efficient in reacting to a given "field of endeavor"; chaos is to be avoided or dealt with by overwhelming force and/or redundant means of force delivery. The present world seems to require a Prigoginean outlook: don’t accept the battlefield or the world system as a fixed given. The complexity, or adaptive self-organizing, metaphor should be very useful for the necessary education, recruitment, planning, and thinking required to deal with and survive our future. However, no obvious specific tool—like predicting crisis instability— comes to mind. The metaphor require that one should always be contemplating the future. And, among these considerations for the future, always include attempts to change the field of endeavor itself.

Hence, it may not be useful for the policymaker to always look for the uniquely "best solution." It may be necessary to settle for a local temporary maximum—a good solution, rather than the best. In the elastic fabric of our present and future world, the "perfect" is often the enemy of the "good."

#### They haven’t contested the truth of complexity theory, which takes out the whole aff—

#### a) Their impacts are impossible to quantify

#### b) Unexpected side effects will undermine the plan

Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ‘97

(Robert, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

Ripples move through channels established by actors’ interests and strategies. When these are intricate, the ramifications will be as well, and so the results can surprise the actor who initiated the change. The international history of late 19th and early 20th centuries, centered on maladroit German diplomacy, supplies several examples. Dropping the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1890 simplified German diplomacy, as the Kaiser and his advisors had desired. More important, though, were the indirect and delayed consequences, starting with Russia’s turn to France, which increased Germany’s need for Austrian support, thereby making Germany hostage to her weaker and less stable partner. In 1902, the Germans hoped that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, motivated by Britain’s attempt to reduce her isolation and vulnerability to German pressure, would worsen British relations with Russia (which was Japan’s rival in the Far East) and France (which sought British colonial concessions).4 There were indeed ramifications, but they were not to Germany’s liking. The British public became less fearful of foreign ties, easing the way for ententes with France and Russia. Furthermore, Japan, assured of Britain’s benevolent neutrality, was able to first challenge and then fight Russia. The Russian defeat, coupled with the strengthening of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, effectively ended the Russian threat to India and so facilitated Anglo-Russian cooperation, much against Germany’s interests and expectations.

In a system, the chains of consequences extend over time and many areas: the effects of action are always multiple. Doctors call the undesired impact of medications "side effects." Although the language is misleading—there is no criteria other than our desires that determines which effects are "main" and which are "side"—the point reminds us that disturbing a system will produce several changes. Garrett Hardin gets to the heart of the matter in pointing out that, contrary to many hopes and expectations, we cannot develop or find "a highly specific agent which will do only one thing.... We can never do merely one thing. Wishing to kill insects, we may put an end to the singing of birds. Wishing to ‘get there’ faster we insult our lungs with smog."5 Seeking to protect the environment by developing non-polluting sources of electric power, we build windmills that kill hawks and eagles that fly into the blades; cleaning the water in our harbors allows the growth of mollusks and crustaceans that destroy wooden piers and bulkheads; adding redundant safety equipment makes some accidents less likely, but increases the chances of others due to the operators’ greater confidence and the interaction effects among the devices; placing a spy in the adversary’s camp not only gains valuable information, but leaves the actor vulnerable to deception if the spy is discovered; eliminating rinderpest in East Africa paved the way for canine distemper in lions because it permitted the accumulation of cattle, which required dogs to herd them, dogs which provided a steady source for the virus that could spread to lions; releasing fewer fine particles and chemicals into the atmosphere decreases pollution but also is likely to accelerate global warming; pesticides often destroy the crops that they are designed to save by killing the pests’ predators; removing older and dead trees from forests leads to insect epidemics and an altered pattern of regrowth; allowing the sale of an anti-baldness medicine without a prescription may be dangerous because people no longer have to see a doctor, who in some cases would have determined that the loss of hair was a symptom of a more serious problem; flying small formations of planes over Hiroshima to practice dropping the atomic bomb accustomed the population to air raid warnings that turned out to be false alarms, thereby reducing the number of people who took cover on August 6.6

#### Linear scenario planning makes wars worse—crushes deterrence and causes asymmetric conflicts with more casualties

Beyerchen, associate professor of history – Ohio State University, ‘97

(Alan D, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

What is the utility of thinking about war—for our potential opponents and ourselves—in nonlinear terms, especially in the high-tech, research-forefront metaphorical terms from the new sciences? For our opponents the usefulness may be the same as it was for Clausewitz. The Germans were underdogs to the French, and Clausewitz wanted to understand and use against the French their linearizing blindspots. He also needed to be the champion of disproportionate effects and unpredictability, for in a linear, predictable world Prussian resistance to Napoleon after 1807 was futile. The opponents of the United States will be looking for our blindspots in an effort to seize opportunities to surprise and shock us. They may also be able to compensate for their disadvantage in military confrontations such as the Gulf War by consciously striving to affect the political context in order to change the conduct of warfare. An understanding of the porousness of the boundaries between politics and war can be a real weapon against those who envision those boundaries to be impermeable.

We need for our own sake to understand the limitations our imagination places upon us. Linearity is excellent for the systems we design to behave predictably, but offers a narrow window on most natural and social systems. That narrowness sets blinders on our perception of reality and offers a weakness for an opponent to exploit. But if we know our limits, we can minimize the extent and duration of our surprise, reducing its value to someone else. And an expanded sense of the complexity of reality can help us be more successfully adaptive amid changing circumstances. By thinking more constructively about nonlinearity, we might be able to design more robust systems when we need them. A new form of modeling that takes such concepts as self-organization to heart allows structures to bubble up from below rather than be imposed from above. With such tools we might come to understand better the biological and historical processes with which we must deal. And we may come to realize how conventional, analytical predictive techniques can themselves stimulate a self-defeating, unfulfillable desire to control more of the real world around us than is truly possible.

### FW

#### Alt solves calculative thinking

Whitehead, Fellow in Politics & Senior Fellow, Nuffield College – Oxford, ‘9

(Laurence, “Losing ‘the Force’? The ‘Dark Side’ of democratization after Iraq,” *Democratization*, 16:2, p. 215 – 242)

Hence, the progress of democratization around the world between the 1970s and the end of the century led to a surge of 'liberal internationalism' according to which the best long-term interests of the democratic West would be served by promoting democracy - even taking risks in order to accelerate the disintegration of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes where the rulers were resisting democratization - in order to produce a more uniformly free and accountable global order.

In other words, the pivotal regime changes of Spain, Poland, and South Africa, and others, were all taken as evidence that the material and security interests of the Western democracies could be well served by a shift in foreign policy stance towards much emphasis on democracy promotion. (Admittedly, the shift was always selective - not directed at the Saudis, for example - and was often more about penalizing governments viewed as recalcitrant for other reasons than about applying consistent standards to friend and foe alike.) But certainly, at the discursive level, it was increasingly assumed that the basic and long-term interests of the West as a whole had turned out to be compatible with democratic values. Not only compatible, but likely to be maximized by a collective international drive to shift the balance of incentives and rewards from preservation of the status quo to liberating the political creativity of disfranchised populations. This, in synthesis, was the thrust of the 'liberal internationalism' that came to the fore in the 1990s, and that has since been put to the test and found wanting, above all in various parts of the Islamic world, most notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, traditional realism was never truly repudiated, and even at its high point liberal internationalism remained on probation. There were always awkward counter-examples (like the Chinese government's crackdown on democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square) to qualify the sweeping optimism that global democratization would readily dissolve implacable geopolitical obstacles and overcome hitherto insoluble sources of violent conflict. The bitter lessons of traditional international relations theory, based on the inevitability of balance of power re-equilibration and the idea that conflicts of interest between states and alliance systems cannot be eliminated, could not so readily be eradicated. Liberal internationalism spread like a layer of treacle on top of these harsher and more jagged foundations, but it did not penetrate all that deeply, as the post-Iraq panorama makes clear. This is hardly surprising, given that a basic tension between security interests and human values - or between a narrow and broad notion of self interest - can be traced back to the very beginning of the analytical literature on international relations, and on the origins of democracy.17

Andrew Hurrell has recently summarized the 'narrative expansion' in favour of democracy and human rights, tracing what he calls its 'deep embedding' within international society, especially after the end of the Cold War. He highlights the rise of electoral assistance and democracy promotion as priorities for the UN and other regional and international organizations, and links this in part to the supposed connection between democracy and peace (an idea that fuelled an academic industry, and that seemed to harmonize the claims of strategic interest with those of proclaimed Western values). 'Democratic peace theorists highlight the importance of normative values, liberal and democratic norms involve shared understanding of appropriate behaviour, stabilize expectations of the future, and are embedded in both institutions and political culture. Rule-governed change is a basic principle; the use of coercive force outside the structure of rules is proscribed',18 and trust and reciprocity, together with the rule of law are at the heart of democratic politics.

This reassuring new academic orthodoxy culminated in the decision of the UN General Assembly to embrace the idea of a 'responsibility to protect' victims of undemocratic regimes (as proclaimed at the UN World Summit, September 2005). But from the outset there were also difficulties. Under international law, there is still no valid justification for going to war in order to bring about forcible regime change. And, in any case, how was the 'international community' to define its will in cases (such as Kosovo, or Tibet, or Chechnya) where the UN Security Council was still divided? The theory of democratic peace widened the gap between those regimes that could get themselves classified as democracies (and were therefore exempted from humanitarian intervention) and those that lacked such status and so found their claims to state sovereignty undermined. This gap could be further widened if Senator John McCain's proposal for a 'League of Democracies' to 'complement' the UN were to gain traction.19

Hurrell summarizes the theoretical issues at stake (even prior to Iraq) as follows:

Pluralists have always laid great emphasis on the problems that arise when foreign policy is driven by concerns for human rights and democracy. In terms of individual states, they feared this would lead to immoderate foreign policies, to crusading, and to the uncontrolled and maybe uncontrollable, expansion of goals. The result would be an unstable foreign policy that would oscillate between excessive engagement and interventionism on the one hand, and disillusion and retreat on the other. In terms of the system … coherence … would always be undermined by the problems of double standards, of self-serving behaviour cloaked in idealistic clothes, and of countries picking only those cases of humanitarian distress and human rights violations that served other political, economic or security interests. The paradox of universalism has always been that the successful promotion of 'universal' or 'global' values would usually depend upon the willingness of particularly powerful states to promote them and that their successful promotion will work to reinforce the already marked inequality of power and status.20

Thus, it should have been apparent even before the failure in Iraq that not all 'good things' necessarily and easily run together. Geopolitical realism and the prudential interests of status quo powers (which includes all the established Western democracies) were never likely to be sustained durably under the liberationist enthusiasms of either the neo-conservatives or the liberal internationalists. But the 'pivotal' experience of the coercive democratization of Iraq has yet to precipitate a full-fledged reassessment of the interaction between the normative expansion of international liberalizing ambitious and the realist backlash arising from the discovery that imposed democratization can become costly and draining for the liberators.

Hurrell's provisional assessment of Iraq is as follows:

as the policy failures have increased, so has the need to blame those failures on the enemies of democracy, and to cast the fight against terrorism as a Manichean global struggle being fought on behalf of democratic civilization. But, on the other side, the possibility of acting consistently in support of democracy become much harder … [and there emerges] … an ever-widening gap between the rhetoric of promoting democracy and the failures in Iraq and the instability elsewhere across the Middle East.21

More time will be required before a settled assessment can be made. But some analytical conclusions are already apparent. Democracy promotion after Iraq cannot revert to the over-confidence of the 1990s. Nor is it possible to simply repudiate all the normative commitments of the liberal internationalist phase, and revert to old-style realism and power politics. International commitments to protect democracy and to engage in humanitarian interventions will continue to demand attention, not least because many recent beneficiaries of liberal internationalism can be expected to argue in their favour. The balance of power in the Middle East and elsewhere has been destabilized by coercive democratization with new forces unleashed and new expectations aroused. This is not easily reversible. But it is also no longer feasible to push ahead regardless of the resistance or the criticisms of those Hurrell describes as the 'pluralists'. Thus, Operation Iraqi Freedom has created a new international environment, one in which the promise and rhetoric of global democratization remains urgent, but also far more clearly in conflict with the prudential calculations of self-interested status quo powers. The two sides of the Melian debate of 416 BC remain as current as ever.22 Analytically, the unfeasibility of a return to either straight democratic idealism or traditional geopolitical realism implies more than just the inevitability of some approximate halfway house. Unsatisfactory lurches between these opposing principles can easily spread insecurity and even give rise to the worst of both worlds. It can undermine the moral authority of the normative case for democratization, while also destabilizing alliances with authoritarian partners. Both tendencies can be harmful to the cohesion and self-esteem of the most long-established Western democracies.

### Links

#### First is Multilat theory overwrites complexity—results in shoddy analysis

Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ‘97

(Robert, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

Similarly, the effect of one variable or characteristic can depend on which others are present. Thus even if it is true that democracies do not fight each other in a world where other regimes exist, it would not follow that an entirely democratic world would necessarily be a peaceful one: democracies might now be united by opposition to or the desire to be different from autocracies and once triumphant might turn on each other. (The other side of this coin is that many of the characteristics of democracies that classical Realists saw as undermining their ability to conduct foreign policy—the tendency to compromise, heed public opinion, and assume others are reasonable—may serve them well when most of their interactions are with other democracies.) To further explore interactions it is useful to start with the basic point that the results cannot be predicted from examining the individual inputs separately. I will then move on to the ways in which the effect of one actor’s strategy depends on that of others, after which I will discuss how the actors and their environments shape each other, sometimes to the point where we should make the interaction itself the unit of analysis.

#### Second is Linear predictions of nuclear war cause pre-emption and destroy deterrence—the alt solves better

Osinga, PhD, colonel – Royal Netherlands Air Force, ‘5

(Frans, “Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd,” Eburon Academic Publishers)

But science can also play a less obvious, but nevertheless equally influential, even detrimental role. In another study on the relation between philosophy, science and military theory (and foreshadowing the advances in Chaos and Complexity theory and their application to the social world) Barry Watts argues strongly that military theorists better take heed of their implicit scientific assumptions. He shows how implicit and explicit deterministic reasoning and analysis lay at heart of some of the strategic errors in practice and in theory that occurred in the latter half of the 20th Century. After an examination of strategic theory and practice, in particular in the field of strategic application of air power and nuclear warfare, he blames ‘Laplacian determinism’, construed as a dominant deterministic Weltanschauung adopted by physicist in the century following Newton’s death142. Laplace established that the solar system was stable and completely determined by physical laws, hence entirely predictable.

From Mitchell’s Winged Defense through Brodie’s Strategy in the Missile Age, mainstream US air power theorists largely overlooked friction, which is to say the collective factors that distinguish real war from war on paper143. Referring to the planning and execution of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) during World War II he states that American airmen have tended to be overzealous in their enthusiasm for pet formulas and engineering-type of calculations, ignoring historical contradictory facts and assuming a static opponent. Not only were the CBO plan’s predictions concerning bombing effects offered with the quantitative precision of a physical science, they were expressly portrayed as effects that would occur if the requisite bombing forces were made available. The thinking behind the planning was mechanistic in the specific sense of not getting involved in the action-reaction typical of combat between land armies144. He claims that contemporary thought concerning nuclear strategy was similarly infatuated with calculations and formulas.

Watts points out that instead of such a Laplacian Weltanschauung, military theory should be based on the assumption that uncertainty is inherent in the physical and social world, and unsolvable. He favors a more organic image of war in which human nature and behavior in war forms the foundation for military theory145. The Clausewitzian concept of friction, which is infused with the notion of unpredictability and uncertainty stemming from the interactive nature of strategy and battle, and from the limits of human cognition, should be at the heart of it146. In fact, enhancing friction in the opponent’s system is considered a prime stratagem147. He bolsters his argument with referring to Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, Kurt Gödel and Claude Shannon who laid the physical and mathematical foundation for the philosophical insight that human knowledge is limited by definition148. All information is imperfect. There is no absolute knowledge, he quotes Jacob Bronowski, an author whose work Boyd too had studied149.

#### Third is Terror-threat discourse is based in irrational fear sustained by corporate and government profit

Greenwald 12

(Glenn, JD in Constitutional Law and recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism and winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award and author of three New York Times Bestselling books and named as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation, “The sham “terrorism expert” industry” Aug 15, 2012, Salon)

Shortly prior to the start of the London Olympics, there was an outburst of hysteria over the failure to provide sufficient security against Terrorism, but as Harvard Professor Stephen Walt noted yesterday in Foreign Policy, this was all driven, as usual, by severe exaggerations of the threat: “Well, surprise, surprise. Not only was there no terrorist attack, the Games themselves came off rather well.” Walt then urges this lesson be learned:

[W]e continue to over-react to the “terrorist threat.” Here I recommend you read John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart’s The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11, in the latest issue of International Security. Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases of supposed “Islamic terrorist plots” against the United States, and show how virtually all of the perpetrators were (in their words) “incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish.” They quote former Glenn Carle, former deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats saying “we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are,” noting further that al Qaeda’s “capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”

In the next paragraph, Walt essentially makes clear why this lesson will not be learned: namely, because there are too many American interests vested in the perpetuation of this irrational fear:

Mueller and Stewart estimate that expenditures on domestic homeland security (i.e., not counting the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan) have increased by more than $1 trillion since 9/11, even though the annual risk of dying in a domestic terrorist attack is about 1 in 3.5 million. Using conservative assumptions and conventional risk-assessment methodology, they estimate that for these expenditures to be cost-effective “they would have had to deter, prevent, foil or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year.” Finally, they worry that this exaggerated sense of danger has now been “internalized”: even when politicians and “terrorism experts” aren’t hyping the danger, the public still sees the threat as large and imminent. As they conclude:

… Americans seems to have internalized their anxiety about terrorism, and politicians and policymakers have come to believe that they can defy it only at their own peril. Concern about appearing to be soft on terrorism has replaced concern about seeming to be soft on communism, a phenomenon that lasted far longer than the dramatic that generated it … This extraordinarily exaggerated and essentially delusional response may prove to be perpetual.”

Which is another way of saying that you should be prepared to keep standing in those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life, and to keep paying for far-flung foreign interventions designed to “root out” those nasty jihadis.

Many of the benefits from keeping Terrorism fear levels high are obvious. Private corporations suck up massive amounts of Homeland Security cash as long as that fear persists, while government officials in the National Security and Surveillance State can claim unlimited powers, and operate with unlimited secrecy and no accountability. In sum, the private and public entities that shape government policy and drive political discourse profit far too much in numerous ways to allow rational considerations of the Terror threat.

#### Fourth is warming - Couching climate change policies in the linear social scientific worldview guarantees the plan fails—the alt is a better starting point to solve warming

Kavalski, professor of IR – University of Western Sydney, PhD international politics – Loughborough University, ‘11

(Emilian, “From the Cold War to Global Warming: Observing Complexity in IR,” Political Studies Review Vol. 9, Issue 1, p. 1-12)

Thus, the mainstream ontological purview of IR has been underpinned by the perception that human/socio-political systems (such as civil society, states, international organisations, etc.) are simultaneously detached from (not only conceptually, but in practice) and in control of the ‘non-human’ natural/biophysical systems. In this respect the mainstream disciplinary conversation is underpinned by a pronounced distinction between human and non-human nature. Not surprisingly, therefore, IR has been concerned only with ‘the human subject’ (and its anthropomorphised effects such as states). Therefore, Haas' presentiment of ‘ecological catastrophe’ (in the epigraph) should be read in the context of such anthropocentric blindness to the profound interlinkages between socio-political and ecological systems.

So how does the confrontation with climate change assist mainstream IR in recovering Morgenthau's recognition of global life ‘as it actually is’? Confirming the difficulty of finding shared language even among like-minded individuals, different responses have been proffered as a reply to this query. On the one hand, most interlocutors in the IR conversation on global warming seem to agree that nothing less than a paradigm shift will do. On the other hand, they are divided about the content and ramifications of this new paradigm. According to Kate O'Neill (2009), the predicaments of forging a common intellectual effort reflect the inability of IR scholars to conceptualise coherently global environmental change. The difficulty emanates from the ‘ideational complexity of climate change’ (Harris, 2009b, p. 9). To begin with, one of the problems is the truncated attention span of commentators, policy makers and publics. Thus, while terrorist attacks draw immediate attention for a concentrated period of time, the ‘attenuated processes’ of global warming are much more difficult to observe and render legible as they become conspicuous over a longer time span (Price-Smith, 2009, p. 197).

Another issue is IR's seeming predisposition to think in ‘intuitive linear’ ways, which encumbers its attempts to address complex problems (Campbell, 2009, p. 170). Premised on the belief in human rationality and fundamental physical order, this understanding reflects the Enlightenment's ‘faith in a “makeable world” ’– i.e. the construction of a secure, stable, predictable environment for human activity (Kavalski, 2009, p. 536). Thus, despite the profound effects of nature on the evolution of human societies, IR prioritises parsimonious accounts whose reductionism is inadequate for the analysis of environmental affairs (Harris, 2009a, p. 7). Perhaps paradoxically, IR's preference for linear conceptualisations can be traced to the origins of the discipline during the twentieth century. At the time, most of nature appeared tamed and contained through the seemingly relentless technological progress and it was humans that required order (Price-Smith, 2009, p. 35).

In this respect, the inability of IR to grapple convincingly with the issues of climate change reflects its imperviousness to the ecology within which human affairs are embedded. The claim in the environmental literature therefore is not that mainstream approaches are blind to the complexity of global life, but that they choose to ignore it (not least because of their focus on willed human/socio-political phenomena). Thus, despite the intellectual challenges posed by the growing interdependence and connectedness between human and non-human systems, the mainstream of IR research has been, on the one hand, dominated by the deterministic and parsimonious tools of the traditional reductionist mode of investigation and, on the other hand, underpinned by an inherent anti-biologism (if not biophobia). In this respect, the contemporary criticism levelled at the constructs of IR emanates not because of their truncated representation of the reality of world affairs, but because of IR's failure to acknowledge that this truncation is only one facet of a much more complex field of observation.

Concurring with this premise, Kurt Campbell and his collaborators indicate that the suggested paradigm shift in IR has been prompted by the realisation that climate change is a non-linear phenomenon capable of producing not only ‘massive nonlinear societal events’, but also ‘nonlinear political events’ (Campbell, 2009, p. 19, p. 135). The engagement with the effects of global warming in IR demonstrate that the traditional boundaries of world affairs are becoming increasingly blurred and indistinct because of the ‘lack of an “enemy” or “other” to act upon [and] uncertainty about who is doing the acting’ (Harris, 2009a, p. 33). Such acknowledgement reveals the emergent properties of the interaction between human and non-human systems. A function of conjunction, emergence intuits that system-wide characteristics do not result from superposition (additive effects of system components), but from interactions among components (Kavalski, 2007, p. 439).

Thus, the paradigm shift implicit in contemporary engagements of the environment in IR recovers Haas' proposition that the recognition of ‘the whole’ of global life as ‘many interconnected parts’ constitutes:

a major revision of our understanding of international relations: Politics among and above nations is recognised as a part of a vast natural system, a biosystem. Therefore, all past units we [have] become accustomed to – territorial units and functional relationships – are subsumed under the biosystemic perspective. All units and all relationships become relevant (Haas, 1975, p. 842).

The recognition of such interwovenness between human and non-human systems defines global life not merely as international politics, but as coexistent ‘worlds’, ‘domains’, ‘projects’ or ‘texts’ of ongoing and overlapping interconnections (Kavalski, 2008, p. 425). Thus, the paradigm shift inherent in the engagement of the environment in IR exposes the urgency of understanding what is happening, why it is happening and how we can/should react (Harris, 2009a; 2009b; O’Neill, 2009). It rests on the recognition that ‘human attempts to tame nature typically result in unforeseen negative outcomes' (Price-Smith, 2009, p. 24). Such unintended effects intimate the uncertainty of the complex interactions between human and non-human systems, which toggle between the old propensities and the sprouting dynamics. While the books under review do not offer a thorough re-conceptualisation of IR's mode of observation, their analysis draws attention to the changing relationship between natural and social systems which opens analytical avenues for future engagements with the complex biophysical bases of world politics.

A key feature of the recognition of such complexity is the suggestion that a hackneyed looking back at historical experience for the uncovering of best practice will not be useful, even if it is possible. In other words, climate change is urging IR to break new ground in an uncharted and constantly shifting terrain. Campbell and his collaborators indicate that history is of little utility as the last experience of abrupt climate change is too far back in the past to be of any relevance to contemporary responses. In recent memory, there is ‘no precedent in human history for a global disaster that affects whole societies in multiple ways at many different locations all at once’. Furthermore, the extrapolation of future trends based on past experiences is complicated by: (1) the difficulty of gauging the plausible effects from repeated, severe weather events that have been unprecedented in human history; and (2) the impact of the speed of technological change and its impact on our responses to environmental problems (Campbell, 2009, p. 44, p. 157).

### AT: Perm

#### Mid East scenario planning engineers specificity—it’s a perfect example of the reductionism we critique

Olsen, professor of national security affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, ‘2

(Edward, U.S. National Defense for the Twenty-First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy, p. 114-115)

As Ted Galen Carpenter suggested in 1992 during this formative phase of post-Cold War US defense policy re-evaluation, the United States was indeed ‘in search of enemies’.11 And – no surprise – it found what it wanted by redefining the global terms of reference of the former Cold War to emphasize the importance of stability, humanitarian intervention, multilateralism, remaining pockets of the Cold War (i.e. Korea), potential new Cold War opponents (i.e. China), shifting added emphasis to long standing transnational threats (such as drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, terrorism, and the environment) and inventing new threat categories of the high-tech variety. This was begun under President Bush and expanded under President Clinton where it became increasingly globalist by nature. By the end of the 1990s, ex-President Bust seemed relieved to be able to affirm that ‘We have plenty of enemies. Our enemies abound’. Importantly, he made these remarks to an intelligence community audeience, reassuring them that their jobs were still essential, on the occasion of the renaming of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) headquarters as the George Bush Center for Intelligence.12

To say the least, this characterization of the United States’ threat environment is an exaggeration. Most of the ‘enemies’ confronting the United States today are the product of an overactive imagination coupled with bureaucratic creativity. The US bureaucracy’s shining example of this inventiveness is the Pentagon’s Threat Reduction Agency, located in Alexandria, Virginia, which is supposed to facilitate the United States’ ability to cope with emergent threats and thereby reduce the potency of these perceived threats. While euphemistically named, this agency really facilitates the production of a heightened consciousness about issues that can be treated as new threats. If the United States has an authentic threat reduction agency, its mission would be to determine how threats were reduced or eliminated, then determine how to implement sunset clauses. Instead, the process of searching for and discovering enough enemies to sustain existing organizations continues. In a play on the biblical sayingabout putting ‘new wine in old bottles’, American leaders seem determined to perpetuate Cold War strategic institutions by putting ‘old win in new bottles’. This is a perverse version of Vice-President Al Gores’ re-inventing government campaign. In this case the United States is reinventing the old rationales for US engagement in world affairs by adapting them to new circumstances for which they were not designed.

#### Cooption DA: The perm channels complexity to improve linear models—causes a reversion to linear thinking

Rosenau, professor emeritus of international affairs – George Washington University, ‘97

(James, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University)

So it is understandable that both the academic and policy-making communities are vulnerable to searching for panaceas. Aware they are ensconced in an epoch of contradictions, ambiguities, and uncertainties, and thus sensitive to the insufficiency of their conceptual equipment, officials and thoughtful observers alike may be inclined to seek security through an overall scheme that seems capable of clarifying the challenges posed by the emergent epoch. Complexity theory is compelling in this regard. The very fact that it focuses on complex phenomena and presumes that these are subject to theoretical inquiry, thereby implying that complex systems are patterned and ultimately comprehensible, may encourage undue hope that humankind’s problems can be unraveled and effective policies designed to resolve them pursued.

Stirring accounts of The Santa Fe Institute, where complexity theory was nursed into being through the work of economists, statisticians, computer scientists, mathematicians, biologists, physicists, and political scientists in a prolonged and profoundly successful interdisciplinary collaboration, kindled these hopes.5 The stories of how Brian Arthur evolved the notion of increasing returns in economics, of how John H. Holland developed genetic algorithms that could result in a mathematical theory capable of illuminating a wide range of complex adaptive systems, of how Stuart Kauffman generated computer simulations of abstract, interacting agents that might reveal the inner workings of large, complicated systems such as the United States, of how Per Bak discovered self-organized criticality that allowed for inferences as to how social systems might enter upon critical states that jeopardize their stability, of how Murray Gell-Mann pressed his colleagues to frame the concept of co-evolution wherein agents interact to fashion complex webs of interdependence—these stories suggested that progress toward the comprehension of complex systems was bound to pay off. And to add to the sense of panaceas, expectations were heightened by the titles these scholars gave to their works written to make their investigations meaningful for laymen. Consider, for example, the implications embedded in Holland’s Hidden Order6 and Kauffman’s At Home in the Universe7 that creative persistence is worth the effort in the sense that eventually underlying patterns, a hidden order, are out there to be discovered.8

There are, in short, good reasons to be hopeful: if those on the cutting edge of inquiry can be sure that human affairs rest on knowable foundations, surely there are bases for encouragement that the dilemmas of the real, post-cold war world are susceptible to clarification and more effective control. Never mind that societies are increasingly less cohesive and boundaries increasingly more porous; never mind that vast numbers of new actors are becoming relevant to the course of events; never mind that money moves instantaneously along the information highway and that ideas swirl instantaneously in cyberspace; and never mind that the feedback loops generated by societal breakdowns, proliferating actors, and boundary-spanning information are greatly intensifying the complexity of life late in the 20th Century—all such transformative dynamics may complicate the task of analysts, but complexity theory tells us that they are not beyond comprehension, that they can be grasped.

I do not say this sarcastically. Rather, I accept the claims made for complexity theory. It has made enormous strides and it does have the potential for clarifying and ultimately ameliorating the human condition. Its progress points to bases for analytically coping with porous boundaries, societal breakdowns, proliferating actors, fast-moving money and ideas, and elaborate feedback loops. But to stress these strides is not to delineate a time line when they will reach fruition in terms of policy payoffs, and it is here, in the discrepancy between the theoretical strides and their policy relevance, that the need to highlight theoretical limits and curb panacean impulses arises.

#### Small risk of cooption takes out solvency

Osinga, PhD, colonel – Royal Netherlands Air Force, ‘5

(Frans, “Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd,” Eburon Academic Publishers)

Already in 1990 James Rosenau had noted that the international system was in a state of turbulence because the fundamental parameters of the system were marked by extensive variability and complexity. This necessitated a novel conceptualization. He noted it was ‘not enough to sense that deep changes are at work, rather one has to develop an overall perspective on the essential nature of world politics through which to transform the perception of a disorderly world into sensitivities for the sources and consequences of the dynamics of change’. And he found such a perspective in the language of chaos and complexity theory as developed by Gleick and Prigogine126. This provides a ‘mental set that does not specify particular outcomes or solutions but one that offers guidelines and lever points that analysts and policy makers can employ to more clearly assess the specific problems they seek to comprehend or resolve’127. The awareness of fundamental unpredictability of complex systems caused four leading scholars to exasperate that ‘God gave physics the easy problems’. And they subsequently suggest that ‘evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science’128.